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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GINOMAESTAS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970298

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions of eight counts of aggravated robbery, first
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-3(3)(i) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to suppress
eyewitness identification testimony?
2. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting a cautionary
eyewitness identification instruction?
3. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to sever the Top

Stop robberies from the Pizza Hut robberies?
4. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting an instruction
on the limited use of potential hearsay testimony?
5. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to consolidate
the robbery charges of the Pizza Hut and Jesse Baldwin?
"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a mixed question of law and
fact," Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984))
6. Should defendant's convictions be reversed because of cumulative error?
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [the reviewing court] will reverse only if 'the
cumulative effect of the several [otherwise harmless] errors undermines our confidence
. . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Determinative statutes and rules are set out in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gino Maestas, was charged with eight counts of aggravated robbery
(R. 55-59). A jury convicted defendant on all counts (R. 105-12). The trial court
sentenced defendant to eight statutory five-to-life terms, Count I consecutive to Count
2, with a one-year consecutive firearm enhancement on each sentence (R. 114-29).
The trial court granted defendant's petition for extraordinary relief and resentenced
2

defendant nunc pro tunc, and defendant, with newly appointed counsel, timely appealed
(R. 136-147, 151).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 2, 1995 a Top Stop, located at 488 East 100 South, and a Pizza
Hut, located at 787 North Redwood Road, were robbed by a lone gunman within less
than one hour of each other (R. 267-68, 292).
A.

Top Stop Robbery.

Paul Harbrecht was working at the Top Stop when, just after 8:00 p.m., a man
wearing a mask, baseball cap, and a two-tone blue coat walked to the counter, pulled
out a black, long-barreled pistol, threw a little backpack on the counter, and demanded
that Paul put all the money in the till into the backpack (R. 268-69). The robber also
demanded that Paul give him his wallet. Paul complied, giving the robber all the
money that was in the till, about $30 to $40, and the $6 that was in his wallet (R. 26971, 286). When the robber walked out, Paul pushed a panic button, thus alerting the
police, and ran outside where he observed the robber jog to and then get into a mid'80s Camaro parked about one block away (R. 271).
Paul's initial reaction was, "Oh no, not again," having been robbed at gun point
three or four months earlier. On this occasion Paul felt calm and had no fears for his
safety, doing exactly as the robber ordered (R. 274). Paul concentrated on the robber's
eyebrows and eyes, both of which were brown. He could also see the robber's nose, of
3

which only the lower part was covered by the mask, although he could not remember
the mask's color (R. 268, 275, 277). Paul also thought the robber had a slight accent
(R. 276). Paul additionally described the robber to Officer Rose Jones, as a male
Hispanic in his twenties, 57" to 5*9" tall, with short dark hair, dark eyes, and an
accent, wearing blue Levis, a white baseball cap with colored writing, and dark twotone blue-green coat (R. 278-79, 289).l From seventy-five to 100 yards away, Paul
thought the car was a 70s model Camaro, gold-colored, though he told Officer Jones
that because of the lighting he could not see the color of the car too well (R. 272, 280).
At trial, Paul did not think that the coat, State's Exhibit 1 (SI), recovered from
defendant's car, or the cap, State's Exhibit 2 (S2), found in his girlfriend's apartment,
were the ones the robber was wearing (R. 269, 272). The entire incident lasted about
one minute, or two at most (R. 271).
While Officer Jones was filling out a report, she received an ATL (Attempt to
Locate) on a robbery at a Pizza Hut on Redwood Road in which the description of the
car and the suspect was "similar if not exact to the description that she had just
received" (R. 280). Defendant was stopped in his blue 1978 Chevrolet Camaro about
one block from the Pizza Hut about ten minutes after that robbery (R. 292, 363-67,
418). Stating that "they had caught a suspect and she wanted [Paul] to identify him,"
1

The booking record, completed four hours after the robbery, indicates that
defendant was a 29 year-old Hispanic man, 5'6" tall, weighing 150 pounds, with black
hair and brown eyes (R. 9).
4

Officer Jones transported Paul to the showup (R. 273, 282).2 Defendant was
handcuffed, with spotlights and headlights of several vehicles on him, among from five
to seven police officers (R. 284, 367, 375, 379, 388). Paul first identified defendant as
the robber from his voice as he and Officer Jones drove by the showup (R. 289-90).3
Paul then asked that defendant face him frontally because that was the position he had
seen the robber. Without hesitation Paul identified defendant (R. 273-74, 283-84).
Paul also identified defendant as the robber at a subsequent lineup and at trial (R. 270).
B.

The Pizza Hut Robbery

1. Kurt Anderson - Just before 9:00 p.m., Kurt, a Pizza Hut employee, first
noticed the robber as both he and the robber approached the counter near the cash
register (R. 294-95). From less than five feet, Kurt observed that the robber wore a
bluish-green and gray jacket, which Kurt identified as State's exhibit 1 (SI) (293-94).
The robber also wore a very dark (black or Navy blue) mask covering all around his
head and only the lower half of his nose, brown hiking boots, Levis, and a cap (S2)
later recovered from the apartment of defendant's friend, Mary Sisneros (R. 293-94,
305). Within this first couple of minutes, Kurt also observed that the robber walked
2

Defendant incorrectly states Officer Jones' said "that they had caught the
suspect and she wanted me [Paul] to identify him." See App. Br. at 5.
3

Defendant suggests that hearing defendant's voice alone was insufficient for
Paul to make an identification. App. Br. at 5. However, a plain reading of Paul's
testimony indicates that he was confident of his voice identification and only further
corroborated it by looking at defendant (R. 289-90).
5

with a limp (R. 304).
The robber stuck a black revolver in Kurt's chest and ordered him to put all the
money from the register into a whitish-colored bag (R. 295-96). Kurt was "pretty
scared" and saw his "life flash[] before [his] eyes" (R. 295). He turned to Jesse
Baldwin, the night manager, told Jesse what was happening, and handed Jesse the bag
(R. 295-96). In response to the robber's command, Kurt got down on the floor with
his head down (R. 296). From this position he was no longer able to watch the robber
or observe his interactions with others in the restaurant (R. 296-99). However, he
heard the robber, who had a Spanish accent, demand money from the safe, the cash
register, and from all those in the restaurant (R. 297, 304). Kurt gave the robber $6,
but kept his wallet (R. 297).
Shortly after the robbery, Officer Richard Findlay took Kurt and Jesse to a
location about a block from the restaurant "to view a possible suspect" (R. 299, 37980). Defendant was standing, handcuffed, standing among several patrol cars with
their spotlights on him and their emergency lights activated (R. 300, 379). Kurt and
Jesse discussed the similarities between defendant and the robber. Jesse said the eyes
looked the same, and Kurt thought the shoes looked the same (R. 381-82). Both Kurt
and Jesse became excited when Officer Cole showed them the coat (SI) recovered from
defendant's Camaro and they said it was the coat worn by the robber (R. 382). From
fifty feet away, Kurt was unsure that defendant was the robber; however, when he
6

came within twenty-five feet of defendant he became certain. At a lineup thirty minutes
later, and again at trial, Kurt positively identified defendant as the robber (R. 293, 30001).4
2. Jesse Baldwin - Jesse received the bag from Kurt as the robber approached
them (R. 308). To Jesse, who was not very familiar with firearms, the revolver looked
brown with a "shiny-chrome assemblage" (R. 308). He felt very nervous (R. 308).
Following the robber's command, Jesse gave him about $160 to $170 from the register,
including about $10 in change, and $15 to $20 from his own wallet, which Jesse kept
(R. 309-13, 322). After hearing there would be a ten minute delay in opening the safe
after the timing cycle was initiated, the robber made the rounds of the other two
employees and the two customers remaining in the restaurant, although Jesse could not
observe these interactions (R. 311-14).
Jesse saw the robber for about four minutes, although sometimes the robber was
as much as thirty to forty feet away (R. 309-11). He appeared to be in his late
twenties, spoke with a "slight accent," had dark brown eyes, thick but not bushy
eyebrows, and walked with a distinctive gait—an odd, off-balance posture or slight limp

4

The record of the lineup, admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 3 (R. 337),
attached at Addendum B, records that defendant was #4 and that the witnesses made the
following selections: Paul Harbrecht - #4, Kurt Anderson - #4, Jesse Baldwin - #4,
Kara Hsiao - #4 with #7 as a possibility, Candace Hsiao - blank (non-recognition) with
#2, #4 and #7 as possibilities, Leslie Kurys - #6, and Shelby Kurys - #7.
7

(R. 319-21, 323). Jesse had described him as weighing 180 pounds, but he was not too
sure of that assessment (R. 320). The robber wore a black mask which seemed to
extend all around his head, a mainly white baseball cap turned backwards, a two-tone
"green, greenish-gray, greenish blue" coat, and Navy-blue or black pants (R. 315-16,
319-20). Although not certain, Jesse identified exhibits SI and S2 as the coat and hat
worn by the robber (R. 316).
When asked by the police at the showup how sure he was on a scale of one to
ten, ten being most positive, that defendant was the robber, Jesse initially answered,
"Eight" (R. 317). However, when he saw the coat, SI, he was convinced without any
question (R. 317). Jesse also correctly identified defendant at the lineup, and reasserted
his certainty in identifying defendant at trial (R. 317, 323, 490).
3. Candace and Kara Hsiao - Candace and her daughter, Kara, were the only
customers in the restaurant (R. 328). Candace first noticed a "vest-type effect that was
kind of shiny, some light blue, some light lavender" at the front of the restaurant (R.
328). Later, the robber, a Spanish or Mexican man wearing a white turned around
baseball cap, a black muffler covering his face from nose to throat and holding a gun,
approached them and politely asked both Candace and Kara for their purses (R. 328,
339). Candace "sort of block[ed] everything out" upon seeing the gun, although fear
and "the shakes" did not set in until after the robber left (R. 330, 332). When Kara
saw the robber with the gun, which she described as black in color and having a long
8

barrel, she felt terrified (R. 340). Candace gave the robber the pouch containing about
$15 in bills and change from her Franklin Planner, and Kara gave him five one-dollar
bills "all crumpled in a ball" from her pocket (R. 329-30, 334-36, 339).
The encounter lasted about one minute (R. 332). As the robber left, Candace
realized that it was the robber who wore the bluish-purplish clothes that earlier caught
her eye (R. 331). She could not positively identify the coat (SI) and cap (S2) as those
worn by the robber (R. 329). At the lineup, both she and Kara were unsure and picked
out defendant and one or two other persons (R. 334, 337, 340, 343). Kara recognized
the coat (SI) as that shown to her at the showup, but was not sure it was the one the
robber wore, nor was she sure she saw the robber at the showup. She thought, but was
not sure, he wore the cap (SI) turned around (R. 340-43).
At trial, Candace thought defendant was like the robber in that defendant's
eyebrows and voice were "familiar" and they were built similarly, but she could not be
sure defendant was the robber (R. 332-33). Kara remembered the robber had a slight
accent and, based on build and defendant' bushy eyebrows, thought defendant looked
like the robber, but she also was not sure (R. 341, 343-44).
5. Leslie and Shelby Kurys - Leslie and her husband, Shelby, were cleaning up
their work stations when Shelby saw the robber walking with Kurt while holding a gun
in his back (R. 346, 353). The robber ordered Shelby to get down, assisted Leslie to
the floor, and politely asked for Shelby's wallet and the couple's wedding rings (R.
9

346-49, 354-56) . Both witnesses saw that the robber's gun was black, and Shelby also
noted that it was either a .44 or .45 caliber long-barrelled revolver (R. 346, 354, 360).
The couple refused to give up their wedding rings, and Shelby had lost his wallet, so
the robber left the couple on the floor to try to get the safe open (R. 348, 356).
The encounter scared Leslie; it only startled Shelby, although he was concerned
when, after consideration, he determined the gun was real (R. 350, 355). From his
position on the floor, Shelby did not have a clear view of the robber, except for the
minute when the robber asked he and Shelby for their jewelry (R. 361). The robber's
eyes appeared brown to Leslie and brown or hazel to Shelby beneath thick eyebrows
(R. 351, 360). Leslie also recognized the robber by the way he walked— "a strut
almost. . . like a macho ego walk" (R. 351). Shelby too noted the robber's "lazy-style
walk . . . [not] really upright" (R. 360-61).
Leslie thought the robber might have been wearing forest-green colored jeans,
but because of the lighting in the restaurant it was "hard to tell what the real color of
clothes are" (R. 347). The mask was like a scarf wrapped all around (R. 351). She
thought the coat (SI) "look[ed] familiar," but she was "100 percent sure" that the
robber wore the cap (S2), or one that looked like it, turned backwards (R. 348, 351).
Shelby described the mask as dark black or gray going from the bridge of the robber's
nose down to his throat (R. 360). He, too, did not remember if SI was the exact
jacket, although the sleeves seemed the same color, but he identified the cap (S2) as the
10

one the robber wore, turned backwards (R. 357-58). Neither Leslie nor Shelby picked
defendant as the robber at the lineup. Supra, n.4. At trial, both Leslie and Shelby
identified defendant, although Shelby was not 100 percent sure (R. 347, 359). Shelby
thought the entire episode lasted about ten minutes (R. 350).
C. Additional Evidence.
Officer Donald Cole was dispatched to the area of the Pizza Hut to look for a
"male Hispanic, dark hair, dark eyes, wearing a . . . blue and green jacket." He
received a later update that the suspect might be in a 1978 or late '70s blue Chevrolet
Camaro. About 3 Vi to 4 blocks from the Pizza Hut he found a blue Chevrolet Camaro
parked in an apartment driveway (R. 363). The hood felt very warm and hot air came
from under the car. From outside the car Officer Cole observed several crumpled up
dollar bills on the passenger seat and a blue and green jacket (SI) in the backseat (R.
364). He placed himself in a position to safely observe. It was now about 9:00 p.m.,
only 10 minutes after he received the report of the Pizza Hut robbery (R. 365-66).
Two people exited the apartment and got into the car. One of them removed
something from the car, took it back to the apartment, returned, and began to drive off.
A few blocks away, Officer Cole stopped the car. In response to Officer Cole's
broadcast, between five to seven officers immediately assisted in the stop (R. 367).
Defendant was driving, accompanied by Mary Sisneros (R. 369, 375). Officers
Findlay and Jones brought the robbery victims to the scene, all of whom positively
11

identified defendant as the robber and the coat (SI), recovered from defendant's car, as
the one the robber wore (R. 364, 369).5 A total of $53, including crumpled dollar
bills, were recovered from the car and Ms. Sisneros' person; however, the gun,
Candace's pouch, the white bag, or any change were never recovered (R. 372-73, 39798, 400-01, 403). When apprehended, defendant was wearing a dark-colored hooded
sweat shirt and sweat pants (R. 387, 402-06). In a consent search of Ms. Sisneros'
apartment, Detective Ray Dalling later found the cap (S2) and a dark blue or black neck
gator and a similar appearing head band, the neck gator being "the type of thing that
could be pulled up to cover the lower part of a person's face" (R. 370, 396-97).6
Defendant testified that at about 5:30 p.m. he went to a family party at Ms.
Sisneros' apartment and stayed there until about 8:50 p.m., when he went to the store
with her (R. 413-14). During his visit he watched television and drank some beer (R.
414). He asserted that (1) he did not commit the robberies, (2) on February 20, he
weighed 135-40 pounds, (3) his eyes are green and he does not limp, (4) he never
changed his clothes that night, (5) his Camaro is a distinctive "low rider" with chrome
wheels and tires, (6) the crumpled one dollar bills belonged to Ms. Sisneros' children,
and (7) he did not have a weapon that night (R. 414-423).
5

The record shows that Harbrecht, Anderson, Baldwin, and Kara Hsiao were at
the showup (R. 282, 340, 379), but is silent as to Candace Hsiao or the Kurys.
6

The neck gator, and presumably the head band, were not collected from the
apartment, and so did not come into evidence (R. 399).
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Ms. Sisneros also testified that defendant was at her apartment from about 5:30
p.m. until about 9:00 p.m., that after he helped her completely clean up from dinner he
watched television, that he never left the whole time, and that defendant repaid a $10
debt that evening (R. 436-39, 444, 447, 449). On rebuttal, Detective Dalling testified
that Ms. Sisneros told him that because she was spent substantial time cleaning other
parts of the apartment, she would not have known whether defendant left and that when
he searched the apartment, he found food throughout the kitchen (R. 452-54).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I - Defendant fails to show that his counsel's inaction in not attempting to
suppress the eyewitness identifications of all the State's witnesses was not a consciously
chosen, reasonable tactic. The tactic was designed to challenge the strong, consistent
identifications of the State's three strongest witnesses, whose identifications could not
be suppressed under State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), by preserving for
impeachment the State's weaker witnesses. Given the strength of the several of the
witnesses identifications, coupled with additional compelling evidence linking defendant
to the crimes, a motion to suppress, even if granted with respect to the weaker
eyewitnesses' testimony, would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome.
POINT II - Competent counsel might have refrained from requesting an eyewitness
jury instruction on the reasonable belief that the jury's focus on those particular areas
of concern identified in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (1986), would have led to
13

crediting the identifications even more emphatically than if the instruction had not been
given. Any error in failing to request a cautionary instruction was harmless since the
defense theory of attacking the reliability of the identifications was evident through
counsel's cross-examination and closing argument, the identifications were consistent
and strong, and other circumstantial evidence was compelling.
POINT III - Trial counsel was not ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop
robberies from the Pizza Hut robberies because the unique similarities in the
commission of the robberies at both locations properly allowed for joinder under the
statute. Joinder was also not prejudicial because (1) the eyewitness identifications at
each robbery location would have been admissible at the separate robbery at the other
location to prove the robber's identity and refute defendant's alibi, (2) joinder did not
compromise defendant's alibi defense, (3) evidence of each robbery was presented
separately from the other, and (4) an instruction was given directing the jury to
consider only evidence related to each charge.
POINT IV - Trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to request an
instruction restricting the substantive use of Officer Findlay's testimony about a nontrial witness's report that a car having the same description as defendant's arrived at
and then left the Pizza Hut just before and after that robbery. The substance of that
testimony had been substantially admitted through three prior witnesses, and a limiting
instruction might actually have focused the jury on the nexus between the Pizza Hut
14

robbery and the identification of defendant's car. Because almost the entire substance
of Officer Findlay's testimony was before the jury and the very similar description of
the car defendant was stopped in was unchallenged, a limiting instruction would not
have affected the outcome of the case.
POINT V - Trial counsel was not ineffective in not moving to consolidate the counts
charging aggravated robbery of property belonging to the Pizza Hut and of Baldwin,
personally. Relevant case law indicates that "intent" is the gravamen of the offense,
and the evidence clearly showed that defendant had distinct and separate intents to rob
first the Pizza Hut and then Baldwin and others in the restaurant.
POINT VI - Because there were no substantive errors in this case, the cumulative
error doctrine does not apply.
ARGUMENT
POINT I - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING
TO SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move
suppress the eyewitness identifications under State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991). However, defendant fails to show that counsel's inaction was not a consciously
chosen, reasonable tactic, given the weight of at least three of the witnesses' testimony,
or that a motion to suppress would likely have resulted in a more favorable outcome,
given its limited chance of success and the overall strength of the evidence.
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that his trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that there exists a
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182,
186 (Utah 1990) (same). To demonstrate objectively deficient performance, the
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance. Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). In addition, the
reviewing court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and
will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them.
Crosby. 927 P.2d at 644 (citing Taylor. 905 P.2d at 282).
A. Defendant Fails to Overcome the Presumption that Not Moving to
Suppress the Eyewitnesses9 Identification was a Reasonable Tactic,
Defendant asserts claims that in light of Ramirez, the eyewitness identifications
in this case were fatally flawed and that reasonable trial counsel, therefore, would have
moved to suppress their identifications. App. Br. at 27-33. However, in evaluating the
evidence under the Ramirez factors and comparing it with the facts of Ramirez.
defendant has variously (1) omitted the witnesses' observation of unique identifying
characteristics of defendant of an order not even recognized in Ramirez. (2)
gratuitously presumed the witnesses' compromised mental states throughout the entire
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incident, (3) overstated the suggestiveness of the showup in comparison with that in
Ramirez. (4) and omitted facts describing conditions and circumstances of observation
much superior to those in Ramirez. In fact, because the identifications in this case, at
least those of Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin, were so clearly superior to the sole
witness who identified the defendant in Ramirez, a motion to suppress would likely fail,
and defense counsel would reasonably have chosen not to attempt to exclude other
weaker eyewitnesses and expose his client to only strong eyewitnesses at trial.
L The Eyewitness Identification in Ramirez was Based on Limited Capacity
and Opportunity to Observe, Made in Poor Conditions, Inconsistent over
Time, and Uncorroborated by Any Other Witness.
In Ramirez, this Court extended its recognition that eyewitness testimony is both
potent yet fallible, see State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986), thereby
requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to the
case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability," preliminary
to admitting such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 780. Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable," this
Court listed the following pertinent factors by which reliability must be determined:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3)
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical
and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
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product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed,
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's.
Id i at781. 7
Applying the above-referenced factors to the eyewitness identification in
Ramirez. this Court found that, although an "extremely close case," the trial court had
properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 782-84.8
7

In Ramirez, two armed, masked men robbed a Pizza Hut. IcL at 776. Shortly
before 1:00 a.m. Kathy Davis, the manager of the Pizza Hut, was preparing to leave
the restaurant in the company of her husband, John Davis, and her brother, Gerald
Wilson. Id. Upon leaving, they were accosted by a man (the "pipe man") wearing a
white scarf across his face who demanded the day's receipts. IcL In the ensuing
scuffle, the pipe man hit Wilson with the pipe and then told a previously undetected
robber ("the gunman") to kill Wilson if he moved again. Id, The gunman, Ramirez,
who also wore a white scarf covering most of his face, was crouched near the corner of
the building, holding a gun. l± When the Davises returned with the bank bag, the
robbers fled. I<L
Ramirez, stopped by a police officer a short time after the robbery and a few
blocks from the Pizza Hut, became a suspect when, through radio broadcasts, he was
found to match the description of one of the robbery suspects IdL at 776-77. Police
transported the Davises and Wilson to the scene of Ramirez's detention, apparently
informing them that "the officers had found someone who matched the description of
one of the robbers." IcL at 777. When the witnesses arrived at the showup, Ramirez, a
dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. IcL He was
the only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were turned on him.
Id. The witnesses viewed him from a patrol car. IcL Only Wilson was able to identify
Ramirez as the gunman; the other two witnesses were unable to identify him as one of
the robbers. KL
8

Regarding the first factor, the witness's opportunity to view the actor during
the event, this Court noted Wilson varied in his statements about how long he viewed
the gunman, from "a few seconds" or "a second," to "a minute" or longer. Ramirez,
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817 P.2d at 782. The evidence indicated that the gunman was crouched by the end of
the building, that Wilson viewed him from between ten to thirty feet, that at one point
his view was obstructed, that the lighting was variously described from good to poor
and the gunman was in a shadowy area, and that Wilson could only determine that the
gunman's eyes were small. Id. at 782-83.
As to the second factor, the witness's attention to the actor, Wilson was fully
aware that a robbery was taking place and claimed to have focused on the gunman to
the exclusion of the pipe man, even though he was still threatened by the pipe man
when he saw the gunman and gave a much more detailed description of the pipe man
than of the gunman at the time of the robbery. Id at 783.
Regarding the third factor, the witness's capacity to observe the actor during the
event, this Court found that it was reasonable to assume that Wilson experienced "a
heightened degree of stress," since, in struggling with his assailant, the witness was hit
once in the stomach with the pipe and almost hit a second time. Wilson described his
eyesight as good with his glasses, and f,[a]side from the late hour and the injury from
the pipe blow," there was no record evidence of any other physical impairments. Id
The fourth reliability concerns whether the identification was spontaneous and
remained consistent or whether it was the product of suggestion. IcL In Ramirez, this
Court found that thirty minutes to an hour between the robbery and the identification
was minimal and that other than the "normal agitation" attendant on being robbed there .
was no indication that Wilson's mental capacity affected his identification. Id at 783.
Although he was aware that one of the other witnesses had not identified Ramirez, he
was not otherwise exposed to other identifications or opinions, and neither of the other
two witnesses identified Ramirez as the gunman. IcL However, the witness's
physical descriptions of the gunman were "confused." Id Wilson gave a very detailed
description of the pipe man, but merely described the gunman as "a male Mexican, five
feet nine inches to six feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levi's, with a white scarf
around the lower part of his face." IdL John Davis, on the other hand, described
Ramirez as five foot six inches tall and wearing a red and white cap. Id at 784.
Although Ramirez had readily visible tatoos on his arms, Wilson did not mention them
at the time of the robbery or at the preliminary hearing, stating for the first time at trial
that he had seen them on the gunman. Id At the time of arrest, Ramirez was wearing
Levis and a blue sweatshirt with paint spattered on the front, but which may have been
worn inside out and a brown baseball cap. Id, At the suppression hearing, Wilson
positively stated that the gunman wore no hat, although at trial he was not sure. Id
Most "troublesome" for this Court was the "blatant suggestiveness" of the
showup, which, as in this case, involved the lone suspect, handcuffed to a fence, the
target of headlights, and surrounded by police who had indicated to witnesses that they
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Notwithstanding the problematic showup in an "extremely close case," this Court,
upheld the trial court's denial of Ramirez's motion to suppress, finding that it could not
say that Wilson's testimony was legally insufficient to warrant a preliminary finding of
reliability. Id at 784.
2. The Eyewitness Identifications in This Case Were Far Superior to
the Sole Identification of the Eyewitness in Ramirez.
Contrary to defendant's claims, see App. Br. at 27, 33, the identifications in this
case are far superior to the sole identification in Ramirez, and would be admissible in
spite of the fact that the trial court did not have the opportunity to review the evidence.
a. Paul Harbrecht - Top Stop. Paul's opportunity and capacity to observe the
robber were excellent and his attention to him obviously focused. Paul viewed the
robber frontally for a minute or two, evidently from a few feet, based on the nature of their encounter, in the light of the Top Stop's interior (R. 271, 284, 294-96). There is
no indication of other distractions, and Paul reported feeling "calm" and without fear
for his safety, complying with the robber's orders and concentrating on the robber's
eyes and eyebrows, all in the context of his having been robbed at gunpoint in the Top

had located someone who fit one of the robber's description. IcL The suggestiveness
of the showup was compounded because none of the witnesses ever saw the gunman
without the mask, and the sole identifying witness made his identification based only on
the gunman's eyes, a view of which this Court assumed must have been compromised
by the gunman's wearing a hat. IcL This Court somewhat discounted the racial
distinction because the identification was based only one the gunman's eyes, physical
size and clothing. IdL
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Stop three or four months earlier (R. 274-75). His description of the robber was
remarkably close to the official description made when defendant was booked (R. 9,
278-79, 289). Approaching the showup, virtually the same as in Ramirez. Paul first
recognized defendant from his voice, which carried a slight accent (R. 276, 289-90).
When shown defendant frontally, Paul identified him as the robber without hesitation
even before defendant was pointed out as the suspect, an identification that remained
consistent at the lineup and at trial (R. 270-74, 283-84). Contrary to defendant's
assertion, there is no evidence that Paul was distracted or that Officer Jones believed or
communicated that defendant was the robber. She merely informed the witness, as did
officers in Ramirez. that they had caught a suspect (R. 282).
b. Kurt Anderson - Pizza Hut. Kurt observed the robber for a couple of
minutes at an angle as they both approached the counter near the cash register, and then
from less than five feet when the robber demanded money (R. 294-96, 303-04). In
those circumstances, he saw the robber's bluish-green coat (SI), whitish cap (S2), both
of which he positively identified at trial, and his brown hiking boots (R. 293-94). He
was admittedly frightened and after being ordered to the floor was no longer able to
watch the robber, thought he heard the robber's Spanish accent and observed that the
robber walked with a limp (R. 295-96, 304). Minutes later, at the showup, Kurt,
though near-sighted, positively identified defendant from within twenty-five feet (R.
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300).9 Although he later exchanged observations with Jesse Baldwin while viewing
defendant, he and Jesse apparently recognized the coat (SI) independently, both men
becoming excited when it was shown to them (R. 381-82). Thirty minutes later, and
again at trial, Kurt identified defendant as the robber (R. 193, 300-01).
c. Jesse Baldwin - Pizza Hut. Jesse also viewed the robber under favorable
conditions for about four minutes, and although he was sometimes as much as thirty or
forty feet from the robber, he was evidently much closer when Kurt, who was within
five feet of the robber, handed him the robber's bag to be filled with cash from the
register (R. 308-11). Though very nervous, he gave a focused description of the
robber, detailing his age ("late twenties"), voice ("slight accent"), eye color ("dark
brown"), eyebrows ("thick but not too bushy"), and distinctive gait ("slight limp"), and
his clothes, a white baseball cap turned backwards and a two-tone greenish-blue coat,
all of which was consistent with descriptions given by other witnesses (R. 351-16, 31921, 323). At the showup, Jesse had some initial question (eight on a one to ten scale),
but became certain when he was shown defendant's coat, which he positively identified
as the robber's at trial (R. 317). Jesse was consistent in identifying defendant both at
the lineup and at trial (R. 317, 323, 490).
d. Candace and Kara Hsiao - Pizza Hut. Candace and Kara similarly viewed

9

Anderson is near-sighted; the record is silent about whether he was wearing
his corrective glasses when he saw the robber or identified him at the showup (R. 300).
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the robber under favorable conditions for about one minute (R. 332). Both women,
however, were very afraid (R. 330, 340). Kara was unsure if she saw the robber at the
showup (R. 340). At the lineup, both women were unsure of their choices and picked
out defendant and one or two other persons (R. 334, 337, 340, 343). At trial, Kara
thought defendant looked like the robber and that the cap (S2) might have been the one
the robber wore, but neither woman could positively identify defendant as the robber or
the coat (SI) as that worn by the robber (R. 329, 332-33, 340-43). In spite of their
uncertain identifications, Candace testified consistently with other witnesses that the
robber was a Spanish or Mexican man whose voice and eyebrows were similar to
defendant's and who wore a mask, a white turned around baseball cap, and a bluishpurplish coat (R. 328, 331). Similarly, Kara said that the robber had a slight accent,
bushy eyebrows, a turned-around cap and brown and green hiking boots (R. 341-44).
e. Leslie and Shelby Kurys - Pizza Hut. Shelby had a clear view of the robber
for about one minute, evidently from very close range since Shelby was with Leslie
when the robber assisted her to the floor and politely asked for the couple's wedding
rings (R. 346, 348-49, 361). Leslie was within five feet of the robber, and although
scared, focused sufficiently to notice that his eyes were brown, to find the coat (SI)
"familiar," and to positively assert that the robber wore the cap (S2) backwards (R.
347-48, 350-51). Shelby was only startled by the encounter, focusing on whether or
not the gun was real (R. 355). He observed that the robber's eyes were brown or
23

hazel, beneath thick eyebrows and that the robber wore the cap (S2) turned backwards
(R. 360). The couple both recognized the robber's distinct gait, and although neither of
them identified defendant at the lineup, they did so at trial, although Shelby was not
100 percent sure (R. 351, 360-61, 347, 359).
With the possible exception of the Hsiaos' identifications, the identifications in
this case, particularly those of Harbrecht and Baldwin, were clearly superior to that of
Wilson, the sole eyewitness in Ramirez. The witnesses' observations of the robber
were made in intrinsically better lighting conditions, over a longer period, generally
from within a few feet. Harbrecht particularly concentrated on the robber's face, and
neither he nor Shelby Kurys were apparently distressed by the encounter. None of the
witnesses in this case were under the special stress of being physically attacked with a
dangerous weapon and suffering an injury with threats of other blows as Wilson was.
Moreover, the uniformity of each witness's description of the robber's eye color,
eyebrows, accented speech, distinctive walk and clothing lends weight to the accuracy
of their individual observations and clearly distinguishes this case from Ramirez, where
the descriptions of the principal witnesses differed substantially from one another and
changed in the course of the proceedings.10 Additionally, there were consistencies in
10

Additionally, Harbrecht's physical description of the robber closely matched
that of defendant when he was booked, and although Baldwin guessed the robber
weighed 180 pounds, as opposed to the 150 pounds noted in the booking record, he
acknowledged that he was not to sure of that observation (R. 9, 279, 320).
Constitutional unreliability is not based on such minor inconsistencies. See State v.
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the Hsiao's and the Kurys observations of such subtle features as the robber's being
polite, and Harbrecht's immediate identification of the robber's voice at the showup,
completely absent from the Ramirez scenario. Finally the showups in both this case
and in Ramirez were virtually identical, and differed only to the extent that Anderson
and Baldwin compared their impressions on a couple of points as they viewed
defendant. However, even that small distinction fades in the face of their spontaneous
recognition of the coat found in defendant's car, an item they both readily identified at
trial. In sum, the eyewitness identifications in this case, with the possible exception of
the Hsiaos', were clearly superior to Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez.
3. Considering the Strength of Some of the Identifications in This Case,
A Reasonable Tactic Would be to Preserve the Weaker Identifications
For Impeachment.
"'" The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 44
(Utah 1996)(citations omitted). Because the eyewitness identifications of at least
Harbrecht, Anderson and Baldwin, were so much more reliable than Wilson's
unsuppressed identification in Ramirez, a motion to suppress these identifications would

Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Utah App. 1995)(finding insignificant "minor"
inconsistencies in identification where victim had adequate opportunity to observe her
assailant); State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, (Utah App. 1992)(finding identification
reliable even though eyewitness mistakenly thought the defendant might have been
wearing shorts and been one of her high school classmates)(citing with approval State
v. Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1983)).
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have been futile. Therefore, this Court should not second-guess trial counsel's
probable decision not to have wasted valuable preparation time in attempting to
suppress identifications that would have been held constitutionally reliable.
More significantly, it may reasonably be presumed that trial counsel in this case
recognized that, at the very most, he might be successful in suppressing the Hsiao's
identifications, and less probably, the Kurys' identifications. If successful, however,
defendant would be faced at trial with the strongest identifications, uncompromised by
the weaker eyewitness identifications he might otherwise have substantially impeached
in cross-examination and effectively argued against in closing. In the circumstances of
this case, it was reasonable trial strategy to forego suppression entirely, a tactic which
this Court and others have found sufficient to rebut claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See State v. VillarreaL 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995)(upholding court of
appeals' conclusion that trial counsel's not objecting to references to seemingly
prejudicial evidence of defendant's probationary record, dismissed criminal charges or
victim's testimony, was "deliberate strategy falling well within the standard of
reasonable professional performance"); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah
1989)(reasonable strategy in foregoing attempt to exclude conceivably inadmissible,
videotaped child hearsay statements and focus instead on "less sympathetic" adult
psychologist who could be shown to have employed "techniques akin to
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brainwashing"), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)."
In this case, defense counsel cross-examined the witnesses on any limitations of
their observations, inconsistencies in their identifications, the suggestiveness of the
showup and any uncertainty in their in-court identifications (R. 275-77, 303-04, 31921, 334, 343-45, 351-52, 359-61), all of which he developed to show asserted
distinctions from defendant's actual appearance (R. 415, 420-21), and highlighted in
closing argument (R. 497-502, 506-08).12 Although counsel's strategy did not produce
the desired result, "an unfavorable result is not sufficient for and does not give rise to a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1258

11

See also Commonwealth v. Conceicao. 446 N.E.2d 383, 389 (Mass. 1983)(no
ineffective assistance in declining to file motion to suppress, alleging suggestive
photographic identification with "minimal chance of success," or based on tactical
choice to instead cross-examine witnesses extensively and strenuously argue the
weakness of the identification testimony); Commonwealth v. Levia. 431 N.E.2d 928,
933 (Mass. 1982)(tactical decision to forego attempted suppression of weaker of two
identification witnesses and seek "spillover" effect from impeachment on crossexamination, and noting, in support of that strategy, that the defense counsel cross
examined the weaker witness extensively and argued the weaknesses of his
identification testimony in closing).
12

For example, in cross-examining Harbrecht, counsel highlighted the extent to
which the mask covered the robber's face, and that the witness failed to observe details,
including the coat (SI) and the cap (S2) which other witnesses identified (R. 275-77).
Counsel was most effective with witnesses who were unsure of their identification. In
cross-examining Kara Hsiao, for example, he brought out her unique observation that
the robber was wearing a white sweatshirt, and that she did not specifically identify
defendant at the lineup or showup, and was uncertain about the cap (S2), the color of
the robber's eyes, or of her in-court identification (R. 343-44). He also elicited further
testimony on the allegedly suggestive circumstances of the showup (R. 375, 388).
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(Utah 1993)(citation omitted).
B. Defendant Fails to Show that He was Prejudiced as a Result of
His Trial Counsel's Not Moving to Suppress the Identifications,
Defendant claims that prejudice is evident since this case is "even closer than
Ramirez." and lacks a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on
admissibility, which in Ramirez this Court deferred to. He further mistakenly and
illogically argues that it would be inappropriate for this Court to make its own findings
and conclusions in the absence of those of the trial court. App. Br. at 33-34.
As set out above, this case is not nearly as "close" as Ramirez, since there is no
reasonable probability that the trial court would have suppressed the testimony
eyewitness testimony of at least Harbrecht, Anderson, Baldwin, and the Kurys.13
Therefore, the absence of findings and conclusions does not present the same difficulty
as in Ramirez. This case is also not like Ramirez, where this Court held that the trial
court had "abdicated" its duty to rule and make findings "when the issue [of
suppression of illegal search and seizure was] raised." Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787

13

See State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187, (Utah 1987)(fmding no abuse of
discretion in trial court's refusal to exclude "equivocal" eyewitness testimony of
identifications made in less that opportune circumstances under pre-Long standard),
cert, denied. 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, (Utah App.
1995)(finding eyewitness identification reliable even though victim, during a nighttime
assault where threatened with a knife, viewed her assailant by street lights and possibly
the dome of her car for about twenty seconds and later at a suggestive showup).
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(emphasis added).14 In this case, the trial court was never asked to rule on the
admissibility of the identifications. Moreover, defendant explicitly begs this Court to
rule without findings and conclusions, since he has argued that the record is adequate to
permit a decision even though the claim of ineffective assistance was not raised in the
trial court. App. Br. at 16 n.4, 28 n.8 (citing Hovater. 914 P.2d at 40).
Finally, any error in trial counsel's failure to move to suppress the identifications
was harmless. As argued above, there is no reasonable probability that under Ramirez,
the identifications of at least Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin would have been
suppressed. Cf Nelson. 950 P.2d at 944 (harmful error where trial court blatantly
disregarded its gatekeeping function and permitted testimony of sole eyewitness which
resulted in conviction).
In addition to the consistent, definitive identifications of Harbrecht, Anderson,
and Baldwin, there was also Harbrecht's observation that the robber drove a 70s or
mid-80s Camaro (R. 271). In fact, defendant was stopped a short time after the Pizza
Hut robbery in his 1978 Chevrolet Camaro (R. 368, 418). The Camaro was located
just minutes after the Pizza Hut robbery at Ms. Sisneros apartment, where defendant
claimed to have been all evening, but the hood was very warm and hot air came from

14

See also State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997)(conviction
vacated where, following motion to suppress and proffer of expert, trial court
"sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional
admissibility of the eyewitness testimony").
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under it (R. 363-66, 413). The robber took five crumpled one-dollar bills from Kara
Hsiao (R. 339). Officer Cole saw several crumpled-up dollar bills on the Camaro's
passenger seat when he first approached it (R. 364). The coat (SI) and the cap (S2)
that most of the witnesses, including Anderson and Baldwin, identified as the robber's
were found in the Camaro and Sisneros' apartment, respectively (R. 293-94, 316, 364,
370). Detective Dalling also found in the apartment a dark blue or black neck gator
capable of concealing the lower part of the face (R. 396-97). In sum, even if some of
the eyewitness identifications had been suppressed, it would not have resulted in a more
favorable verdict, considering the additional compelling evidence.
POINT II - TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT ASKING
FOR A CAUTIONARY EYEWITNESS INSTRUCTION
Even if defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress the
eyewitness identifications, the error was, at most, harmless. Defendant first argues that
on the facts of this case and this Court's holding in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (1986),
his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction
because there was no tactical reason for omitting such an instruction. App. Br. at 24.
In support, defendant argues at length Long's underlying rationales and their
application to this case.
In Long, this Court, considering substantial empirical research, recognized the
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony. Long. 721 P.2d at 488-92.
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Recognizing also that jurors do not commonly appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness
testimony, tending to convict even when an eyewitness had been substantially
discredited, this Court "abandoned its] discretionary approach to cautionary jury
instructions and directed] that in cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall
give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case
and such an instruction is requested by the defense." ML at 492.
Defendant argues that an instruction Long found provisionally acceptable, see kL
at 494-95 n.8, would have educated the jury that the various witnesses' opportunity and
capacity to observe the robber were deficient and that the identifications were not the
product of the witnesses' own memories, evidenced by the suggestiveness of the
showup and the courtroom and some witnesses' inability to identify defendant at the
lineup. App. Br. at 22-23.15
Contrary to defendant's argument, competent counsel might have reasonably
refrained from requesting an eyewitness instruction focusing the jury on those particular
areas of concern identified in Long. 721 P.2d at 493, and applied in Ramirez. 817 P.2d
at 781. While focusing on the unappreciated problems of eyewitness identification, this
Court also recognized that "[a] cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea." Long.
721 P.2d at 492 n.5. The Court then cited research indicating that when the instruction

15

This Court's opinion in Long, containing the provisionally accepted
cautionary eyewitness instruction, is attached at Addendum C.
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in United States v. Telfaire. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), also found provisionally
acceptable by this Court, see id at 493, was given in conjunction with "strong
eyewitness testimony, it bolstered juror's beliefs in the correctness of the
identification." IcL at 492 n.5. Had trial counsel requested an instruction, he might
reasonably have assumed that in applying the criteria for evaluating reliability, the jury
would have been more likely to convict than without such an explicit measuring stick.
As argued at Point IA2 of this brief, the witnesses' identifications were made in
good conditions with sufficient time to observe the robber at close range. Although
most of the witnesses reported some degree of fear, the substantial consistency of their
identification of defendant's features and apparel belies that stress was a significant
factor, and Harbrecht and Shelby Kurys convincingly denied any special stress at all.
None of the additional "capacity" factors suggested in the Long instruction, to wit:
uncorrected visual defects, fatigue or injury, or drugs or alcohol appear to compromise
the identifications. The witnesses were obviously focused on the event. Admittedly,
he showup appears much the same as in Ramirez, and the Kurys did faile to identify
defendant at the lineup. However, reasonable counsel might have concluded that the
jury's item by item accounting of criteria, while beneficial in considering the testimony
of lesser witnesses like the Hsiao's, would be too damaging with stronger witnesses like
Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin.
Even if it was error for trial counsel to refrain from requesting a cautionary
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instruction, the error was harmless. Defendant essentially argues that the trial court's
failure to give a cautionary instruction when eyewitness identification is central to the
case constitutes a failure to instruct the jury on a defendant's theory of the case and is
error per se. App. Br. at 24. First, the directive in Long, that the trial court give a
cautionary instruction in an appropriate case only when one is requested by counsel,
makes clear that the matter is largely one of lawyerly discretion. Second, State v.
Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), relied on by defendant, presents an altogether
different scenario than this case. See id at 78-79 (substantial likelihood that refusal to
give requested instructions, couple with inaccurate voluntary intoxication instruction,
and instruction inadequately distinguishing between general and specific intent, resulted
injury's being confused and misled).
Also, this Court has effectively found harmless a failure to give a cautionary
eyewitness identification instruction upon less compelling facts than in this case. In
State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985),16 the victim was with her assailant for
about twenty minutes, during which the defendant violently raped the victim by
knifepoint in a darkened apartment. Id at 343-44. Although the victim described her
16

In State v. Jonas. 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), a post-Long decision
reviewing a pre-Long claim of error, this Court found the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to give a cautionary instruction. Id,, at 1380-81. Distinguishing the
case, the Court stated that, "[h]owever, in all of the pre-Long cases, unlike the one
before us, it is highly likely that the result would have been exactly the same even if a
cautionary instruction had been given," citing, among other cases, State v. Booker, 709
P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). Id,
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assailant physically, her identification was based on his voice. Id. at 344. There was
some evidence that the defendant had attempted to approach the victim at the local
grocery store where the victim worked and near which the defendant lived and that
defendant had been near the scene of the crime at the time of the offense, although
defendant offered alibi testimony in opposition. IcL In this case, as argued at Point
IA2 and IB, above, seven witnesses testified with substantial consistency, albeit with
varying degrees of assurance, that defendant was the robber, basing their identification
on the robber's face and unique voice and gait. The circumstantial evidence, consisting
of identifying the robber's clothes and Camaro, the presence of crumpled dollar bills
like those taken from Kara Hsiao, and evidence that the Camaro had just been used, in
contravention of defendant's testimony, is clearly stronger than in Booker. See also
State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 652 (Utah 1989)(any error in failing to give cautionary
instruction harmless where four witnesses identified the defendant as robber at trial
even though all four failed to identify him at lineup and two identified wrong person).
Finally, any harm in the jury's not receiving a cautionary instruction was
substantially mitigated by trial counsel's (1) opening statement, which alleged the
eyewitnesses' inconsistent descriptions of the robber (R. 266), (2) cross-examination,
which challenged each witness's identification (R. 275-77, 304, 320-21, 334, 343-44,
351, 359-61), and (3) closing argument, in which trial counsel pointed out the
weaknesses of every witness's identification and how defendant's actual description
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differed from the witnesses description of the robber (R. 497-502, 506-08), all of which
focused the jury's attention on the centrality of the identifications. See Bruce. 779 P.2d
at 652 (no prejudice where the "defense counsel1 s cross-examination of the State's
witnesses and extensive closing argument more than sufficiently alerted the jury to the
possibility of error in eyewitness identification"). Further, the trial court's instructions
generally informed the jury that it was (1) to determine the facts from a comparison of
the evidence (R. 72), (2) the exclusive judge of a witness's credibility, partly based on
whether the witness had contradicted himself on the witness's "opportunity to know,"
"capacity to remember," and "accuracy" (R. 73), and (3) to judge guilt only upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence (R. 93). See People v. Wright. 755
P.2d 1049, 1062-65 (Cal. 1988)(finding harmless failure to give cautionary eyewitness
instruction where, in addition to overall strength of the State's case and weak alibi,
counsel's opening and closing arguments and cross-examination, in conjunction jury
instructions, directed jury's attention to issue of reliability of identifications). In sum,
any error in omitting a cautionary instruction was harmless.
POINT III - DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY
AS THE TOP STOP AND THE PIZZA HUT ROBBERIES WERE
PROPERLY JOINED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-l (1995)
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever
the Top Stop robbery from the Pizza Hut robberies. App. Br. at 35. Under a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to move for severance of the
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charges, a defendant must show (1) that the motion for severance should have been
granted, and (2) ,,4a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different/" State v.
Hallett. 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State
v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954, 958 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1992)
(citation omitted). Defendant fails to meet either prong of the Hallett test.
A. Severance Would Not Have Been Granted as Joinder was Proper and
Not Prejudicial To Defendant Under Utah Code Ann, § 77-8a-l (1995),
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if
the offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together
in their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses . . ., the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts . . . .
Defendant must show that the offenses were improperly joined under section 77-8a1(1), or that even if properly joined, the charges should have been severed under
section 77-8a-l(4)(a) if defendant was prejudiced by the joinder. See State v. Lee, 831
P.2d 114, 117-18 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).
Although this Court has not yet directly addressed the application of this statute, the
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Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted under section 77-8a-l(l), "part of a common
scheme or plan," see Lee, 831 P.2d at 117-18, and "otherwise connected together in
their commission," in State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996), cert
denied. 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997) and State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App.
1997). However, it has not addressed the interpretation of "same conduct" or
"otherwise connected together in their commission" under facts relating to a crime
spree similar to this case.17
1 - "Same Conduct"
Defendant argues that the plain reading of "same conduct" is that "the act which
led to the first charge must also cause the other charges." App. Br. at 40. However,
defendant's reading is self-servingly narrow. In State v. Gotfrey. 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1979), this Court considered the propriety of joinder under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31
(1953), the former joinder statute, employing language arguably reaching the concept
as "same conduct," to wit: "crimes . . . are of the same or similar character, or are
based on the same act or transaction." IcL at 1328. Without mentioning any causal
connection, this Court held joinder improper because the charges of rape and sodomy
involving three separate victims and incidences several months apart, were "not of such
similarity in character and circumstances of commission" Id. Courts applying similar

17

Given the lack of precise authority, this Court can look to other states'
interpretation of similar language. Lee, 831 P.2d at 117.
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language as in Gotfrey. under factual situations similar to this case have found joinder
proper.18 Further, courts evaluating the terms "same course of conduct" or "same
conduct" have upheld joinder in the same circumstances as this case, where defendant,
within one hour, robbed by gunpoint two businesses separated by a few miles.19
2 - "Otherwise Connected Together In Their Commission"
Defendant argues that the term "otherwise connected together in their
commission applies only where "the conduct in one crime precipitates the conduct in
another crime," citing Smith in support. App. Br. at 38-39. However, Smith merely
recognizes that that term clearly embraces the "precipitation" circumstance, not that the
term applies exclusively to such circumstance. See Smith. 927 P.2d at 652-53. In fact,
joinder has been upheld under the same operative term where, as in this case, one
offense did not precipitate another, but rather the offenses were very similar, closely
18

See State v. Brown. 504 So.2d 1025, 1027-29 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (single
morning crime spree, lead to the proper joining of three counts of armed robbery
involving three separate victims in three separate locations); State v. Smith. 735
S.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (armed robbery counts and second degree
murder count properly joined together where defendant used similar tactics and all
crimes were within 24 hours of each other).
19

See United States v. Tavlor. 97 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1996) (joinder of
similarly committed drug offenses under Federal Sentencing Guidelines as "same
course of conduct," where "the guideline term contemplates that there be sufficient
similarity and temporal proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of
criminal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct"); Jones v. State. 487 S.E.2d
62, 65 (Ga. App. Ct. 1997) (joinder of two robberies as "same conduct," committed
four hours apart, in the same geographic area, and in an almost identical manner
constituted a single "crime spree").
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related in time, and involved different victims, as in this case. See Markee v. State,
494 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (joinder based "on same conduct or on a
series of acts connected together" was proper where "evidence showed what amounted
to a three-day, non-stop crime spree"). Thus, the aggravated robberies were correctly
joined under the "connected together in their commission" variant of the statute.
3 - "Part of a Common Scheme or Plan "
In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant induced a gay
man to ride with him on the defendant's motorcycle up into a local canyon where the
defendant robbed the victim at knife point and then left them unclothed, all of which
conduct he repeated with a different gay man from a different bar five nights later. Id,
at 118. The court stated:
"4[i]n order for two crimes to be classified as a common scheme or plan
. . . it is not necessary that the crimes be perpetrated in an absolutely
identical manner, so long as the court perceives a sufficient similarity
between the crimes to make it probable they were committed by the same
person.'"
Lee, 831 P.2d at 117 (citation omitted). Applying this analysis, the court found that
"the striking similarities in Lee's conduct in each incident, coupled with the close
proximity in time of the offenses, supplied a sufficient basis for the trial court to
conclude that the crimes were 'alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan'
under section 77-8a-l(l)." Id. at 118.
The same analysis and outcome apply to this case. The robber used precisely
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the same tactics in committing eight aggravated robberies of two very similar
businesses and six individuals within one hour. Specifically, the robber walked into
two food convenience establishments, the Top Stop and Pizza Hut, on the same night
between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. (R. 268, 292). In each store, he pulled out a gun,
handed the man by the till a bag and demanded the money. (R. 268, 295). In each
case, after he got the money from the registers, the robber demanded of each victim his
or her personal money, but allowed each victim to retain his or her other valuable
personal property, to wit: Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin were allowed to keep
their wallets and the Kurys were allowed to keep their wedding rings (R. 270, 297,
309, 312, 328, 339, 356). Finally, although the robber attempted to conceal his
identity in both instances with a mask (R. 268, 305), each victim identified defendant as
the robber (R. 270, 293, 308, 333, 341, 347, 354). Given the striking similarities of
the robberies, joinder was proper under section 77-8a-l(l), and trial counsel was not
ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop and Pizza Hut robberies.
B. Defendant Was Not Prejudiced by Joinder as Evidence of the
Robberies would be Allowed at Separate Trials Under Rule 404(b).
"'The burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one . . . . ' " Smith, 927
P.2d at 654 (citation omitted). "It is not enough to claim the alleged errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome . . . ." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah
1986). "The threshold inquiry as to whether joinder is prejudicial to a defendant is
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whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial,"
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Lee, 831 P.2d at 118 (citing State v.
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)). Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.20
Defendant in this case put his identity directly at issue by his substantial attempt
at concealment of his identify and the use of an alibi defense. See People v. Gutierrez.
622 P.2d 547, 522 (Colo. 1981)(testimony rebutting alibi admissible despite prejudicial
effect). Given the unique manner by which defendant committed the robberies,
testimony to prove identity as to each robbery, if severed, was properly admissible in
the trial of the other robbery.21

Recently amended rule 404(b), effective February 11, 1998, additionally
provides: "In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is
relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of rules 402 and 403."
Utah R. Evid. 404 advisory committee note.
21

See State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 428-29 (Utah 1989)(recognizing that a
modus operandi, "similarity . . . peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct,"
admissible to show identity); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Utah
1987)(unrelated forgery to prove identity in burglary and forgery case probative under
rule 404(b)); State v. Lvnch. 792 P.2d 167, 169-70 (Wash Ct. App. 1990)(unusual and
distinctive mode of crime commission permitted evidence of two offenses to prove
identity). At the very least, the fact of defendant's being a robbery suspect and the
owner of a Camaro was admissible in each robbery, first in the Top Stop case to make
clear why Harbrecht and Officer Jones went to a showup, and then in the Pizza Hut
robbery to explain why Officer Cole was "initially" searching for "a male Hispanic,
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Further, evidence of each convenience store robbery was not overly prejudicial
in the jury's consideration of evidence in the other convenience store robbery, under
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. First, the identification evidence for each robbery
was probative, but not overwhelming, and was the only means of rebutting defendant's
alibi which applied equally to both robberies. See Lee, 831 P.2d at 118-19 (finding
joinder proper under rule 404(b) where need for testimony bearing on intent great and
probativeness of other offense on that point substantial enough to outweigh prejudice).
Second, evidence of each robbery was presented simply and sequentially, minimizing
any possible confusion of factual issues. State v. . 615 P.2d 190, 199 (Mont. 1980)
(no prejudice from cumulation of evidence in multiple counts when the evidence
presented at trial is simple and distinct). Third, joinder did not compromise the alibi
defense because it applied equally to both convenience store robberies. Finally, an
instruction was given directing the jury to consider only the evidence relevant to that
charge and to not allow its disposition on one charge to affect its verdict on another (R.
84, attached at Addendum D). The instruction, precisely the same as one given in State
v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990), would have mitigated the effect of whatever
alleged prejudice attached to the joinder. IcL at 43 n.5. In sum, because a trial court
would not have found the probative value of each robbery outweighed by its prejudicial

dark hair, dark eyes, wearing . . . a blue and green jacket" before he heard another
broadcast identifying the Camaro used in the second robbery (R. 274, 280-84, 362-63).
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effect, trial counsel was, again, not ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop and
Pizza Hut robberies.
C. Absent the Joinder. There is No Reasonable Probability
that a Different Result would have Occurred.
Defendant argues that even the identifications by Paul Harbrecht, Kurt Anderson
and Jesse Baldwin were suspect and thus there would have been a different outcome
had the robberies been tried separately. App. Br. at 42-43. As discussed in Point IA2,
Harbrecht's, Anderson's, and Baldwin's identification were strong, corroborated and
supported by compelling circumstantial evidence (R. 268-72, 274, 290, 293, 301-02,
304-5, 315-16, 317, 319-21, 328, 340, 347, 351, 360, 363, 418, State's Ex. 3). In
sum, given the strength of the identifications in each store robbery, coupled with the
circumstantial evidence in each case, there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome of each trial would have been different if the robberies of the two stores had been tried
separately.
POINT IV - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT ASKING
FOR A LIMITING INSTRUCTION
At trial, defense counsel moved to strike as hearsay Officer Findlay's testimony
that a blue 477 or '78 Camaro was seen arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut at the time
of the robbery (R. 380, 389-90). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the
testimony was offered to explain why Officer Cole was looking for a car of that
description (R. 391-92). Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
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failing to request a limiting instruction, pursuant to rule 105, Utah Rules of Evidence,
instructing the jury that Officer Findlay's testimony could not be used substantively.
However, as argued below, defendant fails to show that counsel did not make a
reasonable tactical decision in not requesting the instruction or that a limiting
instruction would likely have resulted in a more favorable outcome.
A. Defendant Fails to Overcome the Presumption that Counsel's Failure to
Request a Limiting Instruction was Reasonable Trial Strategy,
Defendant's assertion, that "an acceptable tactical reason for not attempting to
limit the jury's use of this damaging testimony does not exist," see App. Br. at 44 fn.
20, ignores the fact that substantive portions of Officer Findlay's hearsay testimony had
already been heard by the jury in the prior, unobjected-to testimonies of several
witnesses.22 Specifically, Harbrecht testified that the car was a gold-colored mid-80?s
Camaro (R. 271-72). Officer Jones testified that Harbrecht told her it was a brown or
tan '70's model Camaro, though he could not see the color well because of the lighting,
but that "[t]he description of the vehicle in that ATL [Pizza Hut] . . . was similar if not
exact to the description that I had just received from the complaint/vie dm [Harbrecht]"
(R.280, 288). Officer Cole testified that "[s]hortly after I arrived [at the Pizza Hut]
there was an update that the suspect may be in a '78 or late '70s model Chevrolet
Camaro, blue in color," and that "[t]he description that was given to me [by Officer

22

The witnesses' testimony and the court's ruling are attached at Addendum E.
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Jones] was late '70s or early '80s Chevy Camaro" (R. 363, 376). Thus, prior to
Officer Findlay's testimony, three witnesses effectively informed or allowed the jury to
infer that the car involved in both robberies was a late '70s or early or mid '80s model
Chevrolet Camaro whose color might be gold, tan, brown, or blue.
Although the fact of a car's arriving at the Pizza Hut just before the robbery and
leaving just after the robbery was not part of any prior testimony, trial counsel may not
have felt a limiting instruction important, given that a substantial portion of Officer
Findlay's subsequent hearsay testimony was already in the record substantively. See
State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (failure to give limiting
instruction not abuse of discretion where statements "admitted for impeachment
purposes, [] had also previously been admitted in the State's substantive case-in-chief
without objection"); cf State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992) (hearsay
testimony was not so prejudicial as to require mistrial where same evidence was later
admitted without objection). Indeed, trial counsel might reasonably have believed that
a limiting instruction would only further focus attention on the nexus between the Pizza
Hut robbery and the identification of defendant's car. See State v. Colonna. 766 P.2d
1062, 1066 (Utah 1988)(although hearsay and character testimony was inadmissible, "it
is conceivable that counsel made a deliberate and wise tactical choice in not focusing
jury attention on them by objecting"); Utah R. Evid. 105 advisory committee note
("This rule is to be read in conjunction with . . . [§ 77-8a-l] concerning severance, and
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with the caveat that a limiting instruction may be illusory at b e s t . . . . " ) .
In sum, trial counsel's tactical decision to forego a limiting instruction was
reasonable trial strategy, considering it was sensible to believe that such an instruction
might actually harm rather than assist defendant.
B. Even had a Limiting Instruction Been Given, it is Unlikely
To Have Created a More Favorable Outcome at Trial,
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by not having an instruction to limit the
jury's possible substantive use of double hearsay, which use the prosecutor developed
in closing. However, as discussed at Point IVA, above, and based on the testimonies
of Harbrecht and Officers Jones and Cole, and entirely apart from Officer Findlay's
testimony, the jury already had a substantial and legitimate basis to infer that a blue,
late 70s Chevrolet Camaro was used in the Pizza Hut robbery. It is unchallenged that
defendant was stopped moments after the Pizza Hut robbery in his blue 1978 Chevrolet
Camaro (R. 363, 367, 418). Thus, a limiting instruction directing the jury not to use
substantively Officer Findlay's testimony about the movements of a blue 1978
Chevrolet Camaro just before and after the Pizza Hut robbery would have had little
effect on the jury.
Defendant incorrectly asserts that the prosecutor improperly made substantive
use of the hearsay testimony when he referred in closing argument to Officer's
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Findlay's testimony.23 App. Br. at 45. The quoted portion of the prosecutor's closing
argument clearly refers not to Officer Findlay's testimony about the particularly
described car arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut, but rather to the description Officer
Cole received from Officer Jones concerning the Top Stop robbery, a "late '70s or
early '80s, Chevy Camaro, brown in color." (R. 376). This is "the vehicle that
resembles the vehicle that's been described, late '70s Camaro, a little difference in
color, lighting does some strange things with color, doesn't it?" (R. 514) (emphasis
added by def., App. Br. at 45). If the prosecutor was referring to Officer Findlay's
testimony, he would have referenced a blue car arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut.
Instead, he immediately sought to lead the jury to the same inference, that the Camaro
had just been used in the Pizza Hut robbery, conscientiously using the less probative
but legitimate fact that Officer Cole found the Camaro's hood warm (R. 514).
In sum, based on the reasonable inferences the jury could properly make about

In closing, the prosecutor argued:
8:00 where was he? He was at the Top Stop. 8:30 where was he?
He was at Pizza Hut. How do you know? Officer Cole comes up, sees
the vehicle that resembles the vehicle that's been described, late '70s
Camaro a little difference in color, lighting does strange things with
color, doesn't it? It really does some strange things with color.
What did he do, he feels the hood of the vehicle and it's warm. Is
that the vehicle that's been parked there from 5:00 or 5:30?
(R. 513-14).
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the car used in the Pizza Hut robbery, the strength of the eyewitness identifications at
both robbery sites, and the additional compelling evidence of guilt, there is little
likelihood that a limiting instruction would have resulted in a more favorable result.
POINT V - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT
MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE COUNTS II AND VIII WHERE
DEFENDANT INTENDED TO ROB BOTH THE PIZZA HUT
AND JESSE BALDWIN
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consolidate
Counts II and VIII of the second amended information because as to both counts the
robber engaged in "precisely the same conduct of robbing Jesse." App. Br. at 48.24
Defendant correctly cites the "intention" test reiterated in State v. Crosby to determine
if multiple counts constitute a single offense: "[T]he general test as to whether there are
separate offenses or one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or
discloses separate and distinct intents." 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996) (quoting State
v. KimbeL 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980)). Under this test, however, defendant was
correctly charged with two separate counts of aggravated robbery as he intended to rob
both the Pizza Hut and Jesse Baldwin, personally.
It is undisputed that when defendant entered the Pizza Hut, he ordered
24

In contravention of the record, defendant states that the allegations of Counts
II and VIII (Second Amended Information, R. 55-59, attached at Addendum F) are
"identical." App. Br. at 46. In fact, those counts and the relevant instructions (R. 82,
89, attached at Addendum G), clearly indicate that defendant was charged with robbery
of the Pizza Hut property from Baldwin's presence (Count II) and robbery of Baldwin's
property from his presence (Count VIII).
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Anderson and then Baldwin to first empty out the register and then get the money from
the safe (R. 295-297, 307-11). Only after he became impatient waiting for the safe to
open did defendant demand money from Baldwin and others in the restaurant (R. 31114). It is clear that defendant's intention was to first rob the Pizza Hut and then to rob
the individuals in the Pizza Hut.
In contradistinction, this Court in Crosby found that the embezzler had the single
intention of embezzling money from her employer even though she utilized different
methods to accomplish the embezzlement. 927 P.2d at 645-646.

Likewise, the court

in State v. McQueen. 582 P.2d 251, 260 (1978), relied on by defendant, see App. Br.
at 48-49, relied on a single-minded intent to rob. See State v. Stoops. 603 P.2d 221,
228 (Kan. App. 1979)(explaining the result in McQueen, where "the defendant had no
way of knowing that the revolver personally belonged to the employee and thus he had
no criminal intent separate and apart from his intent to rob the store).25
While ownership of the property stolen is not an element of Utah's robbery
statutes, intention is an element. The evidence clearly shows that defendant had distinct
25

See also McKinlev v. State. 400 N.E.2d 1378, 1379 (Ind. 1980)(robbery of
pharmacist's personal belongings separate offense from robbery of money from
pharmacy); United States v. Diggs. 522 F.2d 1310, 1323 (D.C. Cir 1975) (affirming
two robbery convictions from store and store employee), cert, denied. Floyd v. United
States. 429 U.S. 852 (1976); Lash v. State. 433 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ind. 1982) (two
robbery convictions affirmed). But see Mansfield v. Champion. 992 F.2d 1098, 110002 (10th Cir. 1993) (focusing on question of ownership rather than intent, held one
count of robbery when personal and business property taken from one victim).
Mansfield, however, was based on a double jeopardy claim, not urged in this case.
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and separate intents to rob both the Pizza Hut and later Baldwin and others in the
restaurant. Thus, defendant was properly convicted under counts II and VIII of two
distinct robberies "from the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin".
POINT VI - CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [the reviewing court] will reverse only if
f

the cumulative effect of the several [otherwise harmless] errors undermines our

confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.f" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah
1993). Because it is improbable that any identifications would have been suppressed
or that the strongest would have been undermined by an cautionary instruction, or that
the identifications would have been excluded if the Top Stop and Pizza Hut robberies
were tried separately, or that an instruction limiting use of evidence already
substantially before the jury would have had any effect on the outcome, the cumulative
error doctrine has no application to this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that
defendant's convictions be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A _ day of May, 1998.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of anotherfromhis person, or immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediateflightafter the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

Utah Code Ann. (1978)

(repealed)

77-21^31. Criminal joinder — Offenses and defendants.—(1) Two or
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a^
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies*
JOT misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based
on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions con*
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(2) * Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment
or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an
"offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts
together'or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged 'in
each count.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 105. Limited admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.)

ADDENDUM B

METRO JAIL DIVISION
LINEUP REQUEST FORM
"E /TIME OF REQUEST : 03/13/95 1500

DATE /TIME OF LINEUP : 05/09/95 1300

iUESTOR : Sherry
R) : LDA

DATE / TIME OF FINAL I.D. : In Jail
POLICE AGENCY INVOLVED : SLCPD

)SECUTING ATTORNEY : Roger Blaylock
JFIRMED (DATE / TIME) : 05/09/95 1300

POLICE CASE NUMBER :

ENSE ATTORNEY : Steven Johnston
JFIRMED (DATE /TIME) : 05/08/95 1500

COURT DOCUMENT # : 951003291
JUDGE : Hutchings

IER ATTORNEY :
JFIRMED (DATE / TIME) :

PRIOR CANCELLATIONS
(DATE, TIME, BY WHOM AND WHY CANCELED)

IPECT : Maestas, Gino

#1.

>.#) : 130714

REASON :

^RGE(S) : Agg. Robbery 1st. Deg.

#2.

"E OF OFFENSE : 02/20/95
r

REASON :

FILE NAME : Maestas.lup

LINEUP PARTICIPANTS
D.O.B.

RACE

AGE

HGT

WGT

HAIR

EYES

4/25/65

h

30

506

150

blk

brn

2f

Gonzales, Dereck #198165

3/7/77

h

18

506

155

blk

brn

1B9

Giron, Angelo #135392

8/18/63

h

31

507

150

blk

brn

2C3

Adkins, Andrew #174023

4/17/73

h

22

510

170

blk

bm

2C9

Leon, Richard #189756

3/22/69

h

27

508

150

blk

brn

2E

Duran, Steven #174260

8/20/69

h

26

508

150

blk

brn

7b

Medina, Rogers #166495

6/23/69

h

26

510

160

blk

brn

7C

Wood, Kit #197067

4/12/71

h

24

510

150

blk

brn

7B

WGT

HAIR

EYES

PARTICIPANT NAME & S.O. NUMBER
Maestas, Gino #130714

*

<

C E L L J;

ALTERNATE PARTICIPANTS
PARTICIPANT NAME & S.O. NUMBER

D.O.B.

RACE

AGE

HGT

CELL |l

WITNESS VOTING
1 2

3

4

5

Officer Kirk Young / Jail Lineup Coordinator

Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions
Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions
Date: 5-0**25"

Case #:

Signature: ^ / ^ / — J f a t U f t ^ E l
If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.
If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

j

Date

:

^/y//*^ase #:

Signature?
If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.
If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

H

w

Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions

Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions

^"w1**

Date: C-^'*[$

Case #:

Date:

7-9-?*?-

Case #:

•Ml^^te*^

Signature:

Signature:

If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.

If you ^fecognizcrany person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.

If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.

If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.

If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

^

7

Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions
Date: SrCl'C\tb
Signature:

Case #:

U A J Q

ft

lAMAffS

If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.
If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

(o

Salt Lake County Metro Jail
Lineup Identification Instructions
Date v S i f / ^ ^ C a s e ft:
Signature:

C fWtd&L

/
otfc^/j/sVitfi--

If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.
If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.

*

Salt Lake County Metro jau
Lineup Identification Instructions

Date:

Case #:

Signature: / f W

H^^O

If you recognize any person present in this
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please
indicate by marking their number in the square below.
If you do not recognize any person
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in
the crime, mark a zero in the square.
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any
person participating in this lineup as the individual
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark
their number on the back.
/ /

V

(X
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Anthony L. LONG, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19354.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 20, 1986.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., of aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1)
defendant was not unfairly surprised by
admission of documents relating to prior
felony arrest; (2) copies of documents were
not adequately authenticated, and defendant was entitled to new trial on charge of
possession of dangerous weapon by restricted person; (3) defendant was entitled
to cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness identification; (4) trial courts
would be required to give cautionary instruction in future; and (5) defendant
would be entitled to granting of timely
motion for severance of charges on remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, CJ., and Howe, J., concurred in
part and dissented in part and filed opinions.
1. Criminal Law «=>663
Defendant was not unfairly surprised
by prosecution's failure to deliver copies of
documents relating to prior felony convictions, where defense counsel knew that
proof of at least one of those convictions
would be introduced at trial and had made
detailed and capable objection to introduction of those documents. Rules of Evid.,
Rule 64.
2. Criminal Law <s=»444
Copies of documents relating to defendant's prior felony convictions were not
adequately authenticated for purposes of
official-records exception to hearsay rule,
in ahcmino nf ovHHpnrp as to hnw rnnips ornt

uments of Division of Corrections, or t
parole officer was their official or dep
custodian. Rules of Evid., Rule 68(1).
3. Criminal Law <s=>921
Defendant would be entitled to E
trial on charge of possession of dangen
weapon by restricted person where pr
of prior felony convictions at trial \
based on admission of unauthenticated c
uments. Rules of Evid., Rule 63(17)
4. Criminal Law <S=>772(1)
Defendant charged with aggrava
assault was entitled to cautionary instr
tion regarding eyewitness identificati
where victim had observed assailant
brief time from back or side while be
shot and had failed to identify defendant
photographic array shortly after shooti
identifications resulted from suggest
court room proceedings rather than fori
lineups, and victim's description of ass
ant's clothing did not match that worn
defendant at time he was apprehend
5. Criminal Law «=»772(1)
Trial courts must give cautionary
struction whenever eyewitness identifi
tion is central issue in case and that
struction is requested by defense; ato
doning State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d l
(Utah); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 15
(Utah); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d S
(Utah); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d
(Utah); and State v. Schaffer, 638 P
1185.
6. Criminal Law <a=>785(3)
Proper cautionary instruction on e
witness testimony should sensitize jury
factors that empirical research have sho
to be of importance in determining accu
cy of eyewitness identifications, especia
those that laypersons most likely would i
appreciate, and include not only the ext
nals, like quality of lighting and time av;
able for observation, but also internal
subjective factors, such as likelihood of
curate perception, storage and retrieval
information by witness.
7. Criminal Law <a=»785(3)
Cautionary instruction on eyewitn*
identification should address the opportu
ty of witness to view the actor during t
event; witness' degree of attention to t
actor at the time of the event; witne:
canacitv to observe the event, includi
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made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or was the product of suggestion; and the nature of the event being
observed and likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.
8. Criminal Law <s=>620(6)
Defendant charged with aggravated
assault and possession of dangerous weapon by restricted person would be entitled to
granting of timely motion for severance of
those charges on remand. U.C.A.1953, 7735-9.
Karen Jennings, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Dave B.
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

the room. He fired a shot in return. Jacob testified that he saw the face of his
assailant for about six seconds, during
which he was crying and his vision was
"glossy."
Joe Rocha testified that after the shots
were fired he saw two men running away
from the house. One of Joe Rocha's neighbors testified that he heard two shots fired.
He went outside, saw a person approaching
a bronze or tan Oldsmobile Cutlass or Seville with its motor running, and heard
someone say, "Jessie, let's go." The person got in the passenger side of the car and
it drove off.
Robin Lee, an acquaintance of defendant
Long's, testified that she was with Long
and Jessie Hobsun on the evening of March
1st, that they had parked their car in an
alley, and that Long and Hobsun had then
left the car. Hobsun returned shortly, got
in the car, and told Lee to drive away.
Long then approached the car and got in
the back seat. He was wounded. Soon
after, the three became involved in a high
speed chase with the police. When they
were finally stopped, all three were arrested. The arresting officers saw that Long
had a large blotch of red on his shirt in the
abdomen area. Long's coat had two bullet
holes in it, one in the back where the bullet
had entered and another high under the
arm where it had come out.

Defendant Anthony L. Long was convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person, a second
degree felony. Before this Court, Long
claims error in the authentication of documents evidencing his earlier felony convictions, the refusal to sever trial of the two
charges, and the refusal to give cautionary
instructions about the eyewitness identification. We reverse and remand for a new
Three days later, while Jacob Rocha was
trial.
still in the hospital and on medication, a
detective presented him with a photo array
On the evening of March 1, 1983, just and asked him to identify his assailant.
after dark, Joe Rocha was approaching the The photo array included a picture of Long.
front door of his home in Salt Lake City Jacob did not pick defendant Long's photo
when he heard footsteps behind him and a from the array. However, he did select
voice say, "Don't move or I will blow your two other photos, one of which was of
head off." He felt something cold and Hobsun.
metallic on the back of his head. The voice
At trial, Jacob identified Long in person
ordered Rocha onto the front porch of his
house and up against the wall next to the as the man who shot him, as he had previdoor. He faced the wall, unable to see his ously done at two face-to-face encounters
assailant. His girlfriend opened the door during preliminary hearings where Long
and stepped out of the house. She saw a was clearly identified. On cross-examinablack man holding a gun to Rocha's head tion, however, Jacob did not recall being
and another black man coming toward the unable to pick Long's picture from the inihouse. She ran inside, closed the door, and tial photo array. At the close of trial,
told Rocha's son, Jacob, what she had seen. Long's counsel requested cautionary instructions, patterned after those suggested
She then called the police.
in United States v. Tel/aire, 469 F.2d 552
Meanwhile, Jacob took a .357 magnum (D.C.Cir.1972), regarding Jacob's eyerevolver from a desk drawer and went to witness identification. The court refused
the front door. As he started to open the the instructions. Long was found guilty of
door, it was kicked in from the outside. A aggravated assault and possession of a
sawed-off shotgun was fired into the dangerous weapon by a restricted person.
house. Jacob was hit and thrown back into This appeal followed.

Long first challenges his conviction of
possessing a dangerous weapon on the
ground that the documents used to prove
that he was a convicted felon were not
properly authenticated. The charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person involves three elements: (1)
possession of a dangerous weapon (2) by an
individual who is on parole (3) from a felony conviction. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10503(2) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978). To establish
that Long was a convicted felon, his Utah
parole officer, Flint Mollner, was called as
a witness. Through Mollner, the State offered into evidence copies of certified copies of documents from the Davis County
clerk's office showing that Long had been
twice convicted of felonies. The certified
copies from which the copies introduced
into evidence had been made were part of
Mollner's parole file on Long. Long's
counsel unsuccessfully objected to the admission of the copies of the certified copies
in Mollner's files on the grounds that they
were hearsay and were not within any of
the exceptions in the Utah Rules of Evidence. On appeal, Long renews the argument made below.

finds that [the] adverse party has not t
unfairly surprised by the failure to del
such copy." The lower court's finding 1
there was no unfair surprise is suppoi
by the facts. The documents related <
to prior felony convictions, and Long
his counsel certainly knew that proof o
least one such conviction would be ir
duced at trial. Moreover, defense c<
sel's detailed and capably presented ol
tion to the exhibit at trial belies any cl
of unfair surprise. We find no abusi
discretion in the court's ruling.

[1] Long's Rule 64 argument is without
merit. Rule 64 specifically provides that
even if a copy of the document sought to
be admitted is not delivered to opposing
counsel within a reasonable time before
trial, it still may be admitted if "the judge

There is merit, however, to Long's ]
68(1) argument. That rule states: "Ar
ficial record . . . may be evidenced . . . 1
copy attested by the officer having
legal custody of the record, or by his d
ty, and . . . accompanied with a certifi
that such officer has the custody." I
argues that Mollner was not "the ofi
having the legal custody of the rec<
because the originals of the document
issue were official records of the W<
County clerk's office, not of the Utah A
Probation and Parole section. The cei
cation of a Utah parole officer, there!
could not suffice to bring the copies wi
the ambit of Rule 68(1) or, consequei
Rule 63(17). Mollner had only copies
copies that had been certified by the W<
County clerk and was in no positioi
testify that the copies in his posses
were copies of originals because he
never seen the originals. Long ass
that to accept Mollner's authentic*
would make the hearsay rule meaning
in cases involving copies of official recc
To support his position, Long relie;
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (1
1980). In that case, the defendant was
charged with possession of a dange
weapon by a restricted person. A pj
officer introduced copies of court rec<
certified only by a notary public, to s
the defendant's prior felony convict
Because the certification was execute
someone who neither had legal custod

1. At the time of Long's trial, Rules 63(17), 64
and 68 of the Utah Rules of Evidence were still
in effect. These rules have since been supersed-

ed by scattered provisions in the new
Rules of Evidence, which became effective
tember 1, 1983.

The copies were admitted under Utah
Rule of Evidence 63(17)(a), the official
records exception to the hearsay rule.1
Under this provision, the content of an
official record is admissible to prove the
truth of the matter asserted if the requirements of both Rule 64 and Rule 68 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence are met. Long
argues that the prosecutor did not deliver
copies of the documents to opposing counsel within a reasonable time before trial, as
required by Rule 64, and that the copies
were not adequately authenticated, as required by Rule 68(1).
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the records nor was a deputy of the legal
custodian, this Court held that the authentication was inadequate under Rule 68(1) and
ordered a new trial.
The State seeks to distinguish Lamorie.
It argues that in Lamorie the person certifying the copies of the judgment of conviction was only a notary public and not the
custodian of the court records. In contrast, Mollner, who certified the copies, was
legal custodian of Long's parole file.
Therefore, the State asserts that as an
official record of the Adult Probation and
Parole section of the Division of Corrections, the contents of the file were admissible. In making this argument, the State
relies on People v. Howard, 72 Cal.App.
561, 237 P. 780 (1925). Our reading of
Howard, however, leads us to the opposite
conclusion.
In Howard, the prosecution also attempted to prove the fact of a prior felony conriction by introducing a copy of a certified
opy of a judgment and commitment to
tate prison. The original document was
ertified by the clerk of the court entering
he judgment of conviction. The copy of
his document was accompanied by a docment executed by the warden of San
juentin and impressed with the state prisn seal certifying that the introduced copy
ras a "true and correct" copy of the deendant's commitment papers. The CaliDrnia Supreme Court upheld the admission
f the copy into evidence, stating that when
certified copy of a judgment of conviction
delivered with a convict to the state
rison warden, as required by statute, that
>py becomes an official document of the
ate prison, and a certified copy of the
>py, authenticated by the warden, is adissible into evidence. Id. 237 P. at 781.

warden, is statutorily mandated to take
possession of the documents when a prisoner is delivered to him for incarceration.
See U.C.A., 1953, § 64-13-23 (2d Repl. Vol.
7A, 1978); § 77-19-2 (Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982).
However, Mollner, not the Utah state prison warden, certified the copies. There is
no evidence to show how the copies got in
Mollner's file, that the copies in Mollner's
file constituted official documents of the
Division of Corrections, or that Mollner
was their official custodian or deputy custodian. Absent this evidence, there is no
basis in this case for applying the Howard
rationale.
The State urges us to extend the Howard holding, in effect arguing that because
the warden supervises the state prison,
which is under the jurisdiction of the State
Division of Corrections, and because the
warden could be an official custodian of
copies of judgments of conviction, any other branch of the Division of Corrections,
including Adult Probation and Parole,
should also have authority to authenticate
copies of judgments. We decline the invitation.

The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose the exclusion of evidence not subject
to cross-examination concerning the truthfulness of the matters asserted. J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 (Chadbourn rev.
1974). The exceptions to the rule have
evolved to permit the admission of evidence
that is deemed reliable notwithstanding its
failure to satisfy the hearsay rule. Id. at
§ 1420; cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 107, 54 S.Ct 330, 332, 78 L.Ed.2d
674 (1934); United States v. Adams, 446
P.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.1971); Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 724
[2] In the case before us, the copies F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir.1983). In the
troduced into evidence were analogous to present case, the pertinent exception has
ose introduced in Howard. Under How- not been satisfied, and we decline to broad*d, certification by the Utah state prison en it because to do so would permit eviarden that the copies were copies of offi- dence to be admitted without any assural documents of the Department of Cor- ance as to the truth of the matters assertctions and that he was their custodian ed. The State's position would open the
3uld have been sufficient to permit their door to the admission nf anv /lrw»n*«*»*»fe
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we have reviewed many cases in which t
trial court refused to give a cautions
instruction, we have never reversed a o
[3] Because the trial court erred in ad- viction for that reason. We also have be
mitting the copies, the State is left without advised that this Court's de facto failure
proof of one essential element of the first ever require such an instruction has rest
charge against Long—that Long had been ed in trial courts rarely, if ever, givi
previously convicted of a felony.2 As a cautionary instructions. In a recent a
result, a new trial is necessary on the raising the identical issue, the State si
charge of possession of a dangerous weap- gested at oral argument that this Coi
on by a restricted person. See State v. either abandon any pretext of requiring
Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346-47.
cautionary eyewitness instruction or ma
Long next contends that his conviction the requirement meaningful.
State
for aggravated assault must be reversed Quevedo, No. 19049, argued November
because the trial court erred both in re- 1985. We have decided to follow the latl
fusing to give a requested jury instruction course, adopting the approach earlier art
concerning eyewitness identification and in ulated by Justice Stewart in his dissent
refusing to instruct the jury that it could State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 62-66.
permissibly find that he was merely
[4] On the facts of this case, it w
present at the scene of the crime. These plainly improper under Schaffer and
instructions together covered Long's theo- progeny for the trial court not to ha
ry of the case, i.e., that Jacob did not given a cautionary instruction. The Stat*
clearly identify Long as the individual who case hinged on the uncorroborated e]
fired the shot and that Long may have witness testimony of a single witness—t
been merely present when the crime was victim of the crime. The circumstanc
committed.
surrounding his identification raised gra
The requested cautionary instructions re- concerns about its reliability. Jacob Roc
garding eyewitness identification were pat- had an opportunity to view the face of 1
terned on those suggested in United States assailant for approximately sue secon
v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. We have during the assault At the same time
previously said that whether such instruc- was identifying his assailant, he was sh<
tions must be given in a particular case is a was thrown back against the wall by t
matter left largely to the discretion of the force of the blast, returned the fire, a
trial court. State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, experienced "glossy" vision. During t
316 (Utah 1985); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d rest of the thirty or so seconds of obser
1251, 1252 (Utah 1984); State v. Newton, tion, Rocha could see only the back or si
681 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1984); State v. of his assailant as he stood in the darknc
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61-62 (Utah 1982); outside the front door of Rocha's houi
State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 Further, Rocha failed to identify defends
(Utah 1981). We have also indicated that from a six-photo array presented to h
the failure to give such an instruction may three days after the shooting; interestii
constitute an abuse of discretion when the ly, he did select a photo of Jessie Hobsun
circumstances surrounding the eyewitness man who was with defendant on the nig
identification raise serious questions of reli- of the crime but was not prosecuted. I
ability. See, e.g., State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d cha identified Long at trial and at ft
at 1253-54. However, as both counsel not- preliminary hearings; however, the recc
ed at oral argument in this case, although indicates that these identifications to

so long as they wend their way into some
state functionary's file.

2. Mollner's testimony that he supervised Long
on parole is proof of that fact only. It cannot
be inferred from that fact alone that the conviction was for a felony. Because the Board of

ted to county jails as well as to state prisons
is possible that Long might have been on pan
as the result of a misdemeanor conviction, i
U.C.A.. 1953, § 77-27-11 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 19
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place not in formal lineups, but in courtroom proceedings during which Long was
apparently the only black man present. Finally, a significant discrepancy exists between the victim's description of his assailant's clothing and the clothing Long was
actually wearing when police stopped the
car in which he was riding.3
Considering the matters more generically, the circumstances surrounding Rocha's
identification highlight the questionable
wisdom of allowing the uncorroborated
identification testimony of one eyewitness
to serve as the linchpin of the prosecution's
case, at least in the absence of an instruction to the jury focusing its attention on
the well-documented factors that affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.
See F. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You? Expert Psychological Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969 (1977); J. Bibicoff, Seeing is Believing? The Need for
Cautionary Jury Instructions on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification
Testimony, 11 San Fernando Valley L.Rev.
95 (1983); R. Sanders, Helping the Jury
Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The
Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am J.
Crim.Law 189 (1984). The literature is replete with empirical studies documenting
the unreliability of eyewitness identification. See generally P. Wall, Eyewitness
Identification in Criminal Cases (1965);
E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979).
There is no significant division of opinion
on the issue. The studies all lead inexorably to the conclusion that human perception
is inexact and that human memory is both
limited and fallible. We therefore have
concluded that a more rigorous approach to
jautionary instructions than this court has
heretofore followed is appropriate. See
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 62-66
Stewart, J., dissenting).
L It might be argued that the police officer's
testimony that defendant was suffering from a
bullet wound when his car was stopped corroborates the identification of defendant as the
victim's assailant However, two men participated in the incident, and nothing in the testi-

Some background is necessary. Anyone
who stops to consider the matter will recognize that the process of perceiving
events and remembering them is not as
simple or as certain as turning on a camera
and recording everything the camera sees
on tape or film for later replay. What we
perceive and remember is the result of a
much more complex process, one that does
not occur without involving the whole person, and one that is profoundly affected by
who we are and what we bring to the event
of perception. See R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171,
179 (1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific
American 23 (Dec.1974)).
Research on human memory has consistently shown that failures may occur and
inaccuracies creep in at any stage of what
is broadly referred to as the "memory process." This process includes the acquisition of information, its storage, and its
retrieval and communication to others.
These stages have all been extensively
studied in recent years, and a wide variety
of factors influencing each stage have been
identified. See Loftus, supra, at chs. 3-5;
Buckhout, supra, at 172-81.
During the first or acquisition stage, a
wide array of factors has been found to
affect the accuracy of an individual's perception. Some of these are rather obvious.
For example, the circumstances of the observation are critical: the distance of the
observer from the event, the length of time
available to perceive the event, the amount
of light available, and the amount of movement involved. Buckhout, supra, at 173.
However, perhaps the more important
factors affecting the accuracy of one's perception are those factors originating within
the observer. One such limitation is the
individual's physical condition, including
both obvious infirmities as well as such
factors as fatigue and drug or alcohol use.
Another limitation which can affect percepmony suggests that the man wielding the shotgun, rather than the other man, was the one hit
by Rocha's fire. Thus, the testimony going to
defendant's wound can be fairly construed to
indicate only that defendant was present at the
scene of the crime.

tion is the emotional state of the observer.
Contrary to much accepted lore, when an
observer is experiencing a marked degree
of stress, perceptual abilities are known to
decrease significantly. See, e.g., Woocher,
supra, at 979 n. 29.
A far less obvious limitation of great
importance arises from the fact that the
human brain cannot receive and store all
the stimuli simultaneously presented to it.
This forces people to be selective in what
they perceive of any given event. See
Woocher, supra, at 976-77. To accomplish
this selective perception successfully, over
time each person develops unconscious
strategies for determining what elements
of an event are important enough to be
selected out for perception. The rest of
the stimuli created by the event are ignored by the brain. These unconscious
strategies of selective perception work
quite well in our day-to-day lives to provide
us with only the most commonly useful
information, but the strategies may result
in the exclusion of information that will
later prove important in a court proceeding.
For example, the significance of the event
to the witness at the time of perception is
very important. Buckhout, supra, at 17273. Thus, people usually remember with
some detail and clarity their whereabouts
at the time they learned of John F. Kennedy's assassination. Those same people,
however, are generally less accurate in
their descriptions of people, places, and
events encountered only recently in the
course of their daily routines. For instance, few of us can remember the color
or make of the car that was in front of us
at the last traffic signal where we waited
for the light to turn green. An everyday
situation such as this presents an excellent
opportunity to observe, and yet, while such
information may be a critical element in a
criminal trial, our process of selective perception usually screens out such data completely. To the extent that court proceedings may focus on events that were not of
particular importance to the observer at
4. For a critique of this dominant line of research and an alternate approach to applied
eyewitness testimony research, see G. Wells, Ap~

the time they occurred, then, the obser
may have absolutely no memory of
facts simply because he or she failed
select the critical information for perc
tion.4
Another mechanism we all develop
compensate for our inability to perceive
aspects of an event at once is a series
logical inferences: if we see one thing,
assume, based on our past experience, t
we also saw another that ordinarily
lows. This way we can "perceive" a wh
event in our mind's eye when we hi
actually seen or heard only portions of
Id. at 980. The implications of this mei
ry strategy for court proceedings are s
ilar to those of selective perception.
Other important factors that affect
accuracy of a viewer's perception, i
which are unique to each observer, inch
the expectations, personal experiences,
ases, and prejudices brought by any ii
vidual to a given situation. Buckhout,
pra, at 175-76. A good example of
effect of preconceptions on the accurac)
perception is the well-documented fact t
identifications tend to be more accur
where the person observing and the i
being observed are of the same n
Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony
search: System Variables and Estima
Variables, 36 J. Personality & So
Psych. 1546, 1550 (1978); Note, Cross
cial Identification Errors in Crimi
Cases, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 934 (1984); E
coff, supra, at 101.
The memory process is also subject
distortion in the second or retention sta
when information that may or may
have been accurately perceived is store<
the memory. Research demonstrates t
both the length of time between the
ness's experience and the recollection
that experience, and the occurrence of <
er events in the intervening time per
affect the accuracy and completeness
recall. Just as in the perception ste
plied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: Syi
Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. Per
ality and Soc. Psych. 1546 (1978).
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where the mind infers what occurred from
what was selected for perception, in the
retention stage people tend to add extraneous details and to fill in memory gaps over
time, thereby unconsciously constructing
more detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of their actual experiences. Thus,
as eyewitnesses wend their way through
the criminal justice process, their reports of
what was seen and heard tend to become
"more accurate, more complete and less
ambiguous" in appearance. Buckhout, supra, at 179. The implications of this mental strategy for any criminal defendant
whose conviction hinges on an eyewitness
identification are obvious. See Woocher,
supra, at 983 n. 53.
Research has also undermined the common notion that the confidence with which
an individual makes an identification is a
valid indicator of the accuracy of the recollection. K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer
Anything About Their Relationship?, 4
Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980); Lindsay, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect
Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. Applied
Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981); Bibicoff, supra, at
L04 n. 35. In fact, the accuracy of an
identification is, at times, inversely related
to the confidence with which it is made.
Buckhout, supra, at 184.
Finally, the retrieval stage of the memory process—when the observer recalls the
event and communicates that recollection
bo others—is also fraught with potential
for distortion. For example, language imposes limits on the observer. Experience
suggests that few individuals have such a
mastery of language that they will not
lave some difficulty in communicating the
letails and nuances of the original event,
md the greater the inadequacy, the greater
;he likelihood of miscommunication. An
mtirely independent problem arises when
>ne who has accurately communicated his
•ecollection in a narrative form is then
isked questions in an attempt to elicit a
iiore complete picture of the event described. Those asking such questions, by

conscious questioning techniques, can significantly influence what a witness "remembers" in response to questioning. And
as the witness is pressed for more details,
his responses become increasingly inaccurate. See Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15 Jurimetrics J. 188 (1975). In addition, research
has documented an entirely different set of
no less significant problems that relate to
the suggestiveness of police lineups, showups, and photo arrays. See, e.g., Buckhout, supra, at 179-87.
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the
most part, unaware of these problems.
People simply do not accurately understand
the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness. See
K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors
Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 Law and
Human Behavior 15 (1982); J. Brigham, R.
Both well, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 7 Law and Human
Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the common
knowledge that people do possess often
runs contrary to documented research findings. See Loftus, supra, at 171-77.
Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do
not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness
testimony that they give such testimony
great weight See Sanders, supra, at 18990 n. 6; Loftus, supra, at 8-19. In one
notable study involving a simulated criminal trial, 18% of the jurors voted to convict
the defendant when there were no eyewitnesses to the crime. However, when a
credible eyewitness was presented, 72%
voted to convict. And, surprisingly, even
when presented with an eyewitness who
was quite thoroughly discredited by counsel, a full 68% still voted to convict. 15
Jurimetrics J. at 189-90. In one study
which found a poor relationship between
witness confidence and accuracy of identification, the researchers concluded, "[i]t is

around 80% irrespective of the actual rate
of witness accuracy." G. Wells, R. Lindsay, T. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence,
and Juror Perception in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psych. 440, 447
(1979).
The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct.
1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). That
Court has long professed, .as a fundamental
value of our democratic society, that "it is
far worse to convict an innocent man than
to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct 1068, 1076,
25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Yet despite judicial recognition of
the documented unreliability of eyewitness
identification, courts have been slow both
to accord the problem the attention it deserves and to fashion ways of minimizing
its potentially unjust effects. The fault
probably lies with the narrowness of the
vision of most lawyers and judges. We
tend to comfortably rely upon settled legal
precedent and practice, especially when
long-settled technical rules are concerned,
and to largely ignore the teachings of other
disciplines, especially when they contradict
long-accepted legal notions. I.D. Stewart,
Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A
Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
Utah L.Rev. 1, 38; see also B. Clifford, The
Relevance of Psychological Investigation
to Legal Issues in Testimony and Identification, 1979 Crim.L.Rev. 153; State v
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241
(1981).
Even though the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the fundamental
problem posed by eyewitness testimony, its
much-quoted articulation of how one should
approach the evaluation of the credibility
and admissibility of eyewitness identification is a fair example of the lag between
the assumptions embodied in the law and
the findings of other disciplines. The

[T]he factors to be considered in evalui
ing the likelihood of misidentification i
elude the opportunity of the witness
view the criminal at the time of t
crime, the witnesses] degree of att€
tion, the accuracy of the witnesses] pri
description of the criminal, the level
certainty demonstrated by the witness
the confrontation, and the length of tii
between the crime and the confrontatk
Neil v. Riggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.(
375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). A carei
reading of this statement will show tr
several of the criteria listed by the Coi
are based on assumptions that are flai
contradicted by well-respected and esse
tially unchallenged empirical studies, x
though the law will always lag behind t
sciences to some degree because of t
need for solid scientific consensus befc
the law incorporates its teachings, we c<
elude that in the area of eyewitness idei
fication, the time has come for a mc
empirically sound approach.
Some have proposed a radical approa
to the problems of eyewitness identifi
tion. In Great Britain, for example, af
two especially egregious instances of crii
nal convictions based upon mistaken idei
ty, a committee chaired by Lord Devlin v
appointed to study the matter. See G. V
Hams, Evidence of Identification: 1
Devlin Report, Crim.L.R. 407 (1976). ter extensive work, the Devlin Commit
recommended that trial judges should
required to instruct juries that an unc
roborated visual identification alone co
not be a sufficient basis for convictinj
defendant of a crime unless special circi
stances were present Williams, supra,
412-13. These special circumstances s
gested by the Devlin Report were, in
sence, factors which would bolster the I
ability of the visual identification, rat
than provide independent corroborating
dence. Examples of such factors givei
the Report include: (1) the witness's fai
iarity with the identified suspect; (2)
defendant's failure to deny he was a m
ber of a small group, one member of wl
-j
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ant's failure to counter the viewer's story.
Id.

[5] We are convinced that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the
jury in evaluating such testimony is warranted. We therefore today abandon our
discretionary approach to cautionary jury
instructions and direct that in cases tried
from this date forward, trial courts shall
give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a
I case and such an instruction is requested
by the defense. Given the great weight
jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived
flaws in it, to convict a defendant on such
evidence without advising the jury of the
factors that should be considered in evaluating it could well deny the defendant due
process of law under article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution.

It is true that some state courts have
refused to give cautionary instructions on
the ground that they constitute improper
judicial comment on the evidence or suggest the weight that should be accorded
certain testimony. See Annot., 23 A.L.
R.4th 1089, 1110-11 (1983). We see little
merit to this argument. A well-constructed
cautionary instruction will not permit a
judge to opine as to the credibility of the
testimony. It will only pinpoint identification as a central issue and highlight the
factors that bear on the reliability of that
identification. This will do no more than
apprise the jury of the inherent limitations
of eyewitness identification. Such an instruction both "respectjs] the jury's function and strike[s] a reasonable balance between protecting the innocent and convicting the guilty." Sanders, supra, at 204.
The approach we adopt today offers a defendant some protection from false conviction, while ensuring the efficacy of the jury
system by providing jurors with the knowledge necessary for sound decision making.5
[6,7] Having decided that cautionary instructions should be given rather routinely,
the question is whether this court should
adopt one specific instruction as the only
acceptable formulation, or whether we
should grant trial court and counsel some
latitude in formulating instructions. We
have decided to opt for the latter approach,
at least until experience shows that conferring such discretion on trial courts does not
produce adequate instructions. To guide
trial courts, we note that a proper instruction should sensitize the jury to the factors
that empirical research have shown to be of
importance in determining the accuracy of
eyewitness identifications, especially those
that laypersons most likely would not appreciate. These factors should include not
only the externals, like the quality of the

5. A cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea. See D. Starkman, The Use of Eyewitness
Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21
Crim.L.Qtrly. 361, 375-77 (1978-79). The only
study evaluating the Telfaire instruction that has
come to our attention indicated that the model
Telfaire instruction had little effect on jurors'
sensitivity to the factors affecting the reliability
of eyewitness identification. When the instruc-

tion was coupled with a weak identification,
however, it did produce less juror reliance on
the eyewitness identification. Similarly, when
it was given in conjunction with strong eyewitness testimony, it bolstered jurors' beliefs in
the correctness of the identification. See Sanders, supra, at 212 n. 178 and at 217 n. 221. Full
evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary instructions must await further experience.

Perhaps because the Devlin Report's recommendations departed so substantially
from the traditional heavy reliance of the
police and the judiciary on eyewitness identification, they do not appear to have been
adopted. They have, nonetheless, received
some recognition here. See United States
v. Butter, 636 F.2d 727, 735 (D.C.Cir.1980)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting). While we, too, do
not choose to modify the Utah common law
as radically as the Devlin Report suggested, there is no question that credible evidence supports that approach. Such a bold
departure will have to await further empirical evidence that less radical alternatives
do not ameliorate the problem. However,
we do consider ourselves compelled by the
overwhelming weight of the empirical research to take steps to alleviate the difficulties inherent in any use of eyewitness
identification testimony.

STATE v. LONG

Utah

Cite as 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

lighting and the time available for observation, but also the internal or subjective
factors, such as the likelihood of accurate
perception, storage and retrieval of the information by a witness. For example, an
instruction should address the following
commonly accepted areas of concern: (1)
the opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter,
or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the wit-

ness would perceive, remember and
it correctly. This last area includes
factors as whether the event was ai
nary one in the mind of the observe
ing the time it was observed, and w1
the race of the actor was the same
observer's.

6. See. e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552
(D.C.Cir.1972); State v. Green, 86 NJ. 281, 430
A.2d 914 (1981); Smith v. United States, 343
A.2d 40 (D.C.App.1975); State v. Calia, 15 Or.
App. 110, 514 P.2d 1354 (1973), cert, denied, 417
U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 2621, 41 L.Ed.2d 222 (1974);
People v. Guzman, 121 Cal.Rptr. 69, 47 Cal.
App.3d 380 (1975); State v. Warren, 230 Kan.
385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981), and Annot., 23 A.L.
R.4th 1070 (1983); see also R. Sanders, Helping
the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The
Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am J.Crim.L.
189, 222-24 (1984).

as how long or short a time was av
how far or close the witness was, ho1
were lighting conditions, whether the
had had occasion to see or know the
in the past.
[In general, a witness bases any ide
tion he makes on his perception throi
use of his senses. Usually the witness
fies an offender by the sense of sight—1
is not necessarily so, and he may us
senses.J
(2) Are you satisfied that the identii
made by the witness subsequent to the
was the product of his own recollectioi
may take into account both the strengt
identification, and the circumstances
which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witne
have been influenced by the circum
under which the defendant was prese
him for identification, you should sc
the identification with great care. Y<
also consider the length of time that
between the occurrence of the crime
next opportunity of the witness to see
ant, as a factor bearing on the relial
the identification.
[You may also take into account
identification made by picking the de
out of a group of similar individuals i
ally more reliable than one which
from the presentation of the defendai
to the witness.]
[ (3) You [may] take into account ai
sions in which the witness failed to n
identification of defendant, or made ai
fication that was inconsistent with his
cation at trial.]
(4) Finally, you must consider the c
ty of each identification witness in tl
way as any other witness, consider '
he is truthful, and consider whether

7. The instruction suggested by the Telfaire court
reads as follows:
One of the most important issues in this
case is the identification of the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has the burden of [provingl identity,
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential
that the witness himself be free from doubt as
to the correctness of his statement. However,
you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the
person who committed the crime, you must
find the defendant not guilty.
Identification testimony is an expression of
belief or impression by the witness. Its value
depends on the opportunity the witness had to
observe the offender at the time of the offense
and to make a reliable identification later.
In appraising the identification testimony of
a witness, you should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had
the capacity and an adequate opportunity to
observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time
of the offense will be affected by such matters

We have found numerous examp
cautionary instructions.6 Many a
short and superficial as to be of little
in accomplishing our objectives. On
seems to satisfy most of the legi
concerns about eyewitness identifica
that set forth in Telfaire and cite<
approval by Justice Stewart in his c
in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56,
(Utah 1982).7 However, a critical ex;
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tion of the Telfaire instruction, proposed in
1972, reveals that it does not cover several
factors which more recent empirical research have shown to be important, such as
the limitations in our ability to perceive,
store and retrieve information. It also incorporates some of the fallacious assumptions expressed by the Supreme Court in
Neil v. Biggers. (See pp. 491-492, supra.) Be that as it may, the Telfaire instruction would seem to suffice as an adequate cautionary instruction under most
the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter covered in his
testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof
on the prosecutor extends to every element of
the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as
the perpetrator of the crime with which he
stands charged. If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
accuracy of the identification, you must find
the defendant not guilty.
469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1972). (Bracketed portions are optional, depending upon specific facts and circumstances of the case.)
K. The proposed instruction reads:
One of the most important questions [The
only important question] in this case is the
identification of the defendant as the person
who committed the crime. The prosecution
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the
person who committed the crime. If, after
considering the evidence you have heard from
both sides, you are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the
person who committed the crime, you must
find the defendant not guilty.
The identification testimony that you have
heard was an expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the defendant
not guilty, you need not believe that the identification witness was insincere, but merely
that [the witness] was mistaken in his [her]
belief or impression.
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you should consider the following:
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time the witnesses observed

circumstances. The state of the art in jury
instructions is not so advanced that the
failings of Telfaire can be said to disqualify it from use at this point.
A more complete instruction that remedies many of the problems of the Telfaire
instruction has recently been proposed. It
is also more understandable. However, although it appears to be a substantial improvement over Telfairef it is even longer
than the one it would replace.8 If used, it
b) the distance between the witness and the
actor;
c) the extent to which the actor's features
were visible and undisguised:
d) the light or lack of light at the place and
time of observation;
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting
noises or activity during the observation;
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness' opportunity to observe the person committing the crime.
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness' capacity was impaired by:
a) stress or fright at the time of observation;
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices;
c) uncorrected visual defects;
d) fatigue or injury;
e) drugs or alcohol.
[You should also consider whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal
actor. Identification by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a person of the same race.]
[3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to
the criminal actor at the time of the crime?
In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness knew that a crime
was taking place during the time he [she]
observed the actor. Even if the witness had
adequate opportunity and capacity to observe
the criminal actor, he [she] may not have
done so unless he [she] was aware that a
crime was being committed.]
4) Was the witness' identification of the defendant completely the product of his [her]
own memory?
In answering this question, you should consider:
a) the length of time that passed between the
witness' original observation and his [her]
identification of the defendant;
b) the witness' [mental] capacity and state of
mind at the time of the identification;
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or identifications riven hv r>th#»r uritn#»«u

would certainly satisfy our expressed concerns about the need for cautionary instructions.
Acceptable and perhaps shorter instructions other than the two discussed certainly
could be constructed, especially for specific
cases that raise only some of the concerns
about accurate eyewitness identification.
We trust that trial counsel and judges will
be able to produce appropriate instructions
that satisfy the concerns expressed here
today. Perhaps, over time, the lessons of
experience will demonstrate the inherent
superiority of one type or form of cautionary instruction. But in the absence of such
experience, we decline to dictate precisely
what that instruction must say.
The final issue—whether the trial court
erred in denying Long's tardy motion to
sever—need not be reached. However, in
an effort to guide the trial court, which
may well be faced with the same issue on
remand, we make the following observation. On the second day of trial Long
moved to sever the charge of possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person
from the aggravated assault and attempted
murder charges. He claims that denial of
the motion was prejudicial because it put
evidence of his prior conviction before the
same jury that heard evidence on the aggravated assault and attempted murder
charges.
[8] Initially, we note that Rule 9 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure justified
to any other information or influence that
may have affected the independence of his
[her] identification;
jd) any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the
defendant;]
[e) any instances when the witness, or any
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of
the actor that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance;]
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness for identification.
[You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a
group of similar individuals is generally more
reliable than an identification made from the

the trial court's denial of the motion. "
defendant's right to severance of offensi
. . . is waived if the motion is not made
least five days before trial." U.C.A., 195
§ 77-35-9 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982). Assumir
that a timely motion is made on reman
the issue of severance will be presented
essentially the same posture as it was
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Ufc
1985). There, we held that refusal to sev
the possession of a dangerous weapc
charge from the remaining charges was i
abuse of discretion because of the unwa
ranted prejudice inherent in informing tl
jury that a defendant is a convicted felo
Here, too, there seems to be no compellir
reason to present the evidence of pri<
offenses to the jury that is trying the a
sault charges.
The conviction is reversed and the cas
remanded for a new trial.
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concu
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and di
senting):
I join the Court in remanding for a ne
trial on the charge of possession of a da
gerous weapon. However, I do not agr<
that because the trial court refused to gr
a cautionary instruction on the reliability
eyewitness testimony the defendant is all
entitled to a new trial on the charge
aggravated assault.
[You may also take into account that iden
fications made from seeing the person a
generally more reliable than identificatio
made from a photograph.]
I again emphasize that the burden of pre
ing that the defendant is the person who coi
mitted the crime is on the prosecution.
after considering the evidence you have hea
from the prosecution and from the defem
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimo
in light of the considerations listed above, y
have a reasonable doubt about whether t
defendant is the person who committed t
crime, you must find him not guilty.
R. Sanders, Helping the Jury Evaluate f?j
witness Testimony: The Need for Addition
Safeguards, 12 AmJ.Crim.L. 189, 222-24 (198
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In State v. Green,1 the Court stated the
law in Utah to be:
In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not
permitted to comment on the evidence
It is the sole and exclusive
province of the jury to determine the
facts in all criminal cases, whether the
evidence offered by the state is weak or
strong, is in conflict or is not controverted
These principles of law are so
fundamental in our system of criminal
procedure that we deem it unnecessary
to cite cases and authorities in support
thereof.
In the cases that have followed, the
Court has adhered to the principle of law
espoused in Green and in Utah R.Civ.P. 51
and Utah R.Crim.P. 19 that a trial judge is
not permitted to comment on the quality or
credibility of the evidence and may not
indicate that the evidence is either weak or
convincing.2 However, as was observed in
State v. Sanders,3 the principle of law that
precludes the trial court from commenting
on the evidence does not preclude the court
from including in its instructions general
statements concerning certain types of evidence. The court is only enjoined from
commenting on the quality or credibility of
the evidence in such a way as to indicate
that it favors the claims or position of
either party. The enjoinder is necessary to
prevent any intrusion upon the prerogatives of the jury to judge the credibility of
the evidence and to determine the facts.
Consistent with these concepts, the Court
has concluded that the giving of special
instructions on eyewitness testimony
should be left to the sound discretion of the
trial court.4 On appeal, this Court scruti-

nizes the instructions given to the jury to
determine if, when viewed as a whole, the
instructions adequately advised the jury on
the law pertaining to the case.5 Specifically, the Court has noted that three general
instructions cover the same substance as a
cautionary instruction: (1) that the State
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; (2) that the jury is the
exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses; and (3) that to find guilt the jury
must find the defendant committed all of
the elements of the offense.6
I am not persuaded by the facts of this
case that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to give a special cautionary instruction in addition to the general
instructions on burden of proof, reasonable
doubt, and witness credibility that were
given.
The credibility of Jacob Rocha was tested
on direct and on cross-examination, and
defense counsel thoroughly explored the
issue of his credibility in final argument to
the jury.
The defendant's theory of the case was
that he was merely present at the scene
and that he was incorrectly identified as
the gunman. However, the defendant rested at the close of the State's case in chief
without calling any witnesses. Thus, the
uncontroverted evidence placed the defendant at the doorway and not in some other
area where a stray bullet might strike him.
Furthermore, the evidence was that Rocha
was able to observe the defendant standing
alone in the doorway for some thirty seconds attempting to reload the shotgun and

1. 78 Utah 580, 589-91, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931).
See also Utah R.Civ.P. 51; Utah R.Crim.P. 19
(U.C.A., 1953. § 77-35-19 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982
ed.)) (providing that the court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the
court refers to any of the evidence, it shall
instruct the jury that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact).

4. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342. 346 (Utah 1985);
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985);
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984);
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Utah
1984); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah
1984). See also State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185,
1187 (Utah 1981); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d
353. 359 (Utah 1980).

2. State v. Rosenbaum, 22 Utah 2d 159. 160, 449
P.2d 999, 1000 (1969); State v. Sanders, 27 Utah
2d 354, 362, 496 P.2d 270. 275 (1972).

5. Id

3. 27 Utah 2d at 362. 496 P.2d at 275.

6. Id

STATE v. LONG
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that Rocha fired at the defendant and hit
him.
The defendant makes no claim of insufficiency of the evidence, and indeed there is
none. In fact, even if Rocha had been
unable to identify the defendant as his assailant, the remaining undisputed evidence
made out a prima facie case upon which the
jury could deliberate guilt or innocence:
the defendant was on the scene; the shotgun blast came from a lone person who
appeared in the doorway; that person was
fired upon by Rocha; and the defendant in
fact was struck by the bullet fired by Rocha.
I would affirm the conviction of aggravated assault.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur in remanding for a new trial on
the charge of possession of a dangerous
weapon.
I would affirm the conviction of aggravated assault because it does not rest entirely
on the identification made by Jacob Rocha.
It is also supported by strong circumstantial evidence. Jacob testified that a man
(whom he identified as the defendant) fired
a sawed-off shotgun through the door as it
was forced open. Jacob was then four to
five feet away from the door. He "flew
back" twelve feet and from that location
looked out the doorway and saw the man
with the shotgun apparently reloading it
Jacob picked up his handgun and fired it at
the man, who was eighteen to twenty feet
away. At no time did he see anyone else
through the doorway other than the man
who had shot him. According to the testimony of Robin Lee, when the defendant
and Hobsun returned to their car, it was
Long and not Hobsun who was wounded.
The arresting officers also saw that Long
had been shot As pointed out by the Chief
Justice, these facts fully support the conclusion that it had to be the defendant and
not someone else who was Jacob's assailant, quite independently of Jacob's eyewitness identification of the defendant

I would continue to adhere to our pre
rule that the giving of a cautionary insl
tion on eyewitness identification is di*
tionary with the trial court.
Stat
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). ]
lieve that this rule has worked well. '
we have not reversed a trial court foi
fusing a defendant's request, as poi
out by the majority opinion, fails to p
otherwise. We have usually, if not ah*
found evidence corroborating the
witness identification. When a cautio
instruction is given, I would favor a 1
instruction, couched in general cautio
terms. The instruction suggested in
majority opinion (and it is only sugge?
is in my opinion much too long, repetit
and leads the jury through a defc
checklist By its sheer length and dets
overshadows the other instructions ar
heavily slanted in favor of the defem
It is not clear whether the jury can rel
the identification if they have reason
doubt about any of the twenty consk
tions which are listed.
The suggested instruction is also o
tionable to me because it incorporates
elusions from the articles relied upon ii
majority opinion which I am not prep
to embrace. For example, in factor (3)
suggested instruction states as a fact
"[e]ven if the witness had adequate o]
tunity and capacity to observe the crir
actor, the witness may not have don
unless he was aware that a crime
being committed." While I agree as a
eral proposition that an observer M
give more attention to a scene wher
thought a crime was being committed
he might ordinarily otherwise do, it b
means follows that because the obs<
does not know that a crime is being
mitted, his identification and perceptioi
be less accurate or faulty. Some p
are keenly observant, and their ident
tion is very reliable if they have an
quate opportunity to observe. This v
be true even though the setting was
ness, social, or casual. The fact tr
crime was not being committed *
make no difference.

ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO.
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the
information.

Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it

should be considered separately.

The fact that you may find the

accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged
should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.

ADDENDUM E
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1

A.

Six dollars*

2

Q.

What happened after that?

3

A.

Let's see, after that he just turned

4
5
6
7
8

around and he walked out the door.
Q.

About how long did this total event

take place?
A.

Oh, I figure a minute, maybe two

minutes at the most.

9

Q.

Did you see how he left?

10

A.

Yes, he was walking -- the door faces

11

to the north, and he walked out the door and around

12

the side of the building, which is a glass around

13

this area, and then out towards the sidewalk.

14
15
16

Q.

Did you see any vehicle in the

vicinity?
A.

Yeah, after he left the store and after

17

he got to the sidewalk, I pushed the panic button

18

for the police.

19

over to the gas pumps and down to the sidewalk.

20

was watching him jog down the street to 2nd South

21

and 5th East.

22

the car made a right turn.

Then I ran out the door and ran
I

He proceeded to get into a car and

23

Q.

What type of a car was that?

24

A.

I said it was a late -- about a mid '80

25

Camaro.

1

Q.

Do you recall the color?

2

A.

At the time I said it was a gold color.

3

Q.

How far were you away from that?

4

A.

Oh, about 75 yards f

5

It was

basically one block.

6
7

100 yards.

Q.

Now besides the coat, did he have any

other clothing on?

8

A.

He had a baseball hat.

9

Q.

What kind was that?

10

A.

It had some words on it, but I didn't

11

see the words.

12

Q.

And what color was that?

13

A.

To be honest, I really don't remember.

14

I want to say it was a brown tannish color.

15

(Whereupon, State's Exhibit 2 was

16

marked for identification.)

17

THE COURT:

May I approach, Your

THE COURT:

You may.

18

Honor?

19
20

Q.

(By Mr. Blaylock)

Would you look at

21

State's proposed Exhibit No. 2.

22

familiar at all?

23
24
25

A.
honest.
Q.

Does that look

I really couldn't tell you to be
I really don't think this is the same one.
Do you have anything further to do with
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1

Q.

Is he the individual that left as you

2

came in?

3

A*

Yes, he is*

4

Q.

That would be Paul Harbrecht?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

What did he tell you had happened?

7

A.

He was working as an employee at the

8

store, the Top Stop.

And a man came into the store

9

and held him at gun point, basically took the money

10

from the till.

11

own individual money and took that also.

12
13

Q.

Then asked for his wallet and his

Did he give you a description of the

person who had committed this robbery?

14

A.

He did give me a very good description.

15

Q.

What was that?

16

A.

Male Hispanic.

He said like 20s, about

17

five seven, to five nine, dark hair, dark eyes.

18

clothing description he said a white hat and a

19

coat.

20

A

The coat was very descriptive.
Q.

While he was filling out the report,

21

did something occur that caused you to follow up on

22

this a little bit?

23

A.

Yes, it did.

24

Q.

What was that?

25

A.

I heard an ATL, which is an attempt to
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locate on a robbery that just occurred at the Pizza
Hut on Redwood Road,

The description of the

vehicle and of the suspect in that ATL was similar
if not exact to the description that I had just
received from the complainant slash victim.
Q.

What had he told you about a vehicle?

A.

He said that it was a Camaro.

The way

the lights were sitting on the road, he couldn't
see the color really well f but he could tell it was
a '70s model Camaro which is the same style of
vehicle that was described from the other robbery.
Q.

How long did this occur after he had

been robbed?
A.

Just

—

Q.

That you received the attempt to

locate?
A.

Within minutes.

have a copy of my report?

I believe —

do you

I think I wrote the

times.
MR. BLAYLOCK:

My I approach, Your

Honor?
THE COURT:

You may.

Direct opposing counsel to the document
that you've just handed the witness.
THE WITNESS:

I can refer to that and
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1

robber had an accent?

2

A.

Sounds familiar r but I don't recall.

3

Q.

It's correct, isn't it f Officer Jones,

4

that Mr. Harbrecht initially described the vehicle

5

as being light in color?

6

A.

I thought he said dark in color.

7

Q.

I believe -- I would refresh your

8

recollection by indicating that I have examined the

9

notes and so now you do agree with that?

10

A.

I wrote brown or tan, so medium color.

11

Q.

All right.

12

Did you recover any items

of physical evidence in your investigation?

13

A.

Did I f myself?

14

Q.

Yes.

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Are you aware of any other items of

17

physical evidence which were recovered in the

18

course of the investigation which I have not made a

19

reference to?

20

A.

The coat.

21

Q.

Okay, anything else?

22

A.

Not at the time I was there.

23

MR. JOHNSTON:

24

THE COURT:

25

Thank you.

Any redirect?

174
1

A.

Yes, I did.

2

Q.

Which one specifically do you recall?

3

A.

I recall hearing the broadcast on both

4

robberies.

I was dispatched as a back up officer

5

at the Pizza Hut.

6

Q.

What location did you go to?

7

A.

I responded to the area of 700 North

8

and Redwood Road.

9

car, which means I was to check the surrounding

10
11
12
13

I was assigned as a perimeter

areas for the suspect or suspect vehicle.
Q.

What were you looking for

specifically.
A.

What was reported to you?

Initially what was reported was a male

14

Hispanic, dark hair, dark eyes, wearing a -- I

15

believe it was a blue and green jacket.

16

after I arrived there was an update that the

17

suspect may be in a '78 or late '70s model

18

Chevrolet Camaro, blue in color.

Shortly

19

Q.

So what did you do?

20

A.

I proceeded to check the area.

I went

21

eastbound on 700 North from Redwood Road.

At

22

Catherine Circle, which is approximately 1440 West

23

on 700 North, I noticed a blue Chevy Camaro.

24

looked like there was a '70s model parked in the

25

driveway of one of the apartments.

It
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Q.

To your knowledge, was any money

recovered from Mr. Maestas?
A.

I don't know, I don't believe so.

Q.

Did you talk to the victim at the Top

Stop robbery?
A.

I did not.

Q.

Did it come to your attention that

there had been a description of the vehicle used in
the Top Stop robbery?
A.

Yes, Officer Jones gave me a

description of the vehicle used.
Q.

And was his description based upon what

the victim had imparted to him?
A.

Yes, her description was based on that.

Q.

Excuse me, Officer Jones is a female.

It's correct, is it not, that the vehicle was
described as light colored vehicle?
A.

The description that was given to me

was late '70s or early

'80s, Chevy Camaro, brown in

color.
MR. JOHNSTON:

Thank you.

I have

nothing further.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. BLAYLOCK:
witness, Your Honor.

Nothing further of this
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1

A.

Officer Michelle Sanchez was my backup

2

officer at the scene, at the Pizza Hut.

3

I had entered the restaurant, she had entered the

4

restaurant after talking with a witness outside the

5

parking lot, who reported that he'd seen a blue

6

Camaro come into the parking lot prior to the

7

robbery, and leave the parking lot just after the

8

robbery.

9

Q.

10
11
12
13

And after

Was there any more description than,

that it was a blue Camaro?
A.

The witness that Officer Sanchez spoke

to believed it might be a •77 or '78 Camaro.
Q.

As you approached this scene then at

14

550 North Redwood Road, was there any conversation

15

between you and victims of these robberies?

16

A.

The conversation that I had with the

17

victim was prior to leaving the scene.

18

that the purpose that I was transporting them down

19

there was to view a possible suspect in the crime.

20
21
22

Q.

I told them

Did either or both of them say anything

then as you approached?
A.

Not that I recall as we approached.

23

give them instructions as to what it was that we

24

were looking for as far as possible

25

identification.

I

And we approached and stopped and
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Q.

You've indicated that the witness,

Mr. Martinez, described a Camaro leaving the
premises at the Top Stop.

Could you tell me who

that was?
A.

Not at the Top Stop, it was at the

Pizza Hut.
Q.

Excuse me, I meant to say Pizza Hut.

A.

I did not speak to Mr. Martinez

directly.

Officer Sanchez at the restaurant told

me she had spoken with that witness.
Q.

Do you know where that witness is now?

A.

I don't know where that witness is.

Q.

Were your aware of an investigation

that involved people allegedly prowling in the
Catherine Street neighborhood, Catherine Circle
neighborhood?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you take part in that

investigation?
A.

I did, immediately following the search

that Detective Dalling, Officer Cole and I
conducted at the address 619 North Catherine
Circle, we searched the immediate area surrounding
the few houses in that circle.

From the radio call

that came out, there were several juveniles -- one
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1

We will be in recess for 15 minutes.

2

(Recess•)

3

THE COURT:

The record will reflect

41

Mr. Johnston, out of the presence of the jury f

5

counsel for the defendant, has requested the

6

opportunity to make a motion out of the jury's

7

presence.

You may proceed.

8

MR. JOHNSTON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

9

Your Honor and Mr. Blaylock.

At this

10

time I would like to move the Court to enter an

11

order which strikes the testimony of the previous

12

witness, I believe it was Officer Findlay, which

13

testimony pertained to an out-of-court statement,

14

the origin of which was one Mr. Martinez.

15

substance of which was that Mr. Martinez had

16

observed a blue Camaro leaving the premises of the

17

Pizza Hut restaurant at or about the time of the

18

robbery which is the subject of this action.

19

The

I submit in support of that, Your

20

Honor, that it is hearsay, it is an out-of-court

21

statement which is not subject to the

22

cross-examination of the defendant, and it's

23

offered -- Your Honor, whatever the intent of its

24

offering, I submit that part of it would be to have

25

a corroborative affect of the color of the Camaro
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being similar to that of the Camaro owned by the
defendant.
In support further of our motion, I
would indicate to the Court that as this testimony
came forth, I was unaware that it was coming from
Mr. Martinez, as Mr. Martinez being the source.

I

had assumed, Your Honor, that the prosecution would
offer a witness subject to our cross-examination
which would state the substance of that
objectionable material, that is the color of the
vehicle leaving the premises, which color and
description were similar to the vehicle owned by
Mr. Maestas.

And, therefore, not being aware that

this witness was not going to be available, we did
not make an objection at that time.

We do desire

to impose our objection at this time.
THE COURT:

A very brief response.

MR. BLAYLOCK:

Your Honor, the state

offered the evidence to show why Officer Cole did
what Officer Cole did.

It was offered to show that

that information was the information regarding a
description of a vehicle which was broadcast over
the dispatch that Officer Cole wanted to observe
this Camaro then approached it because it fit the
general description, not offered to prove the
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1

matter asserted.

2

that he was responding to a

3

light-type f

4

Particularly it's offered to show

light-colored vehicle.
THE COURT:

The Court finds, if both

5

sides have completed their argument, that the

6

statement of the officer is hearsay.

7

time honored exception to the hearsay rule where

8

evidence of that nature is offered not to establish

9

the truth of the fact, but simply to give meaning

There is a

10

to the trier of fact on what the officer did.

In

11

this particular case in response to that evidence.

12

The record should reflect that most of

13

the witnesses described the car as a different

14

color than blue.

15

some said it was tan, some said it was brown, they

16

all described it as a Camaro.

17

testified that someone at the Pizza Hut saw this

18

blue Camaro going into the parking lot prior to the

19

robbery, was there a very short time and left

20

immediately after the robbery.

21

Some said it was a light color,

And the officer

And based on that information, the

22

officer conducted an independent investigation and

23

after seeing the car parked, determining the engine

24

had been operating within just a short time prior

25

to his touching the hood with his hands, and

203
1

observing the crumpled up money in the coat from

2

the backseat then staked the car out.

3

defendant came out of the apartment complex,

4

arrested him.

5

And when the

And the Court finds that the testimony

6

was not offered to prove that the car seen arriving

7

at the Pizza Hut parking lot shortly before the

8

robbery and leaving shortly thereafter was in fact

9

the car used in the robbery, simply it was used to

10

give meaning to the officer's investigation after

11

he has received the information.

12

stricken.

13

The motion is

Bring the jury in.
You may be seated.

The record will

14

reflect the presence of the jury, both counsel and

15

the defendant.

16

Court has been in session out of your

17

presence on some matters, legal, as opposed to

18

factual in nature.

19

and now we're ready to proceed with the

20

presentation of the evidence.

Those matter have been resolved

21

Call your next witness.

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Step forward and be sworn.

RAY E. DALLING,
called as a witness, having been first duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
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Defendant.

The undersigned Roger S. Blaylock, a Salt Lake County District Attorney, under oath
states on information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of:
COUNTI
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 488 East 100 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of Top Stopfromthe person or immediate presence of Paul Herbrecht, and
in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon, to-wit: a gun, further a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery,
giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
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COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of Jesse Baldwin of Pizza Hut from the person or immediate presence of
Jesse Baldwin of Pizza Hut, and in the course of committing said robbery used or
threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, further a firearm or a facsimile
of a firearm or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance
of the Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
COUNT III
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of Candace Hsiao from the person or immediate presence of Candace
Hsiao, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
COUNT IV
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of Kara Hsiao from the person or immediate presence of Kara Hsiao, and
in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous
weapon, to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
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COUNT VIII
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6,
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
the possession of Jesse Baldwin from the person or immediate presence of Jessee
Baldwin, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a
dangerous weapon to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
D. Cole, Rose M. Jones, Ray Dalling, Paul Herbrecht, R. Findlay, Don Cole, Ray
Dalling, Dave Ward, Frank Werner, Jesse Baldwin, Candace Hsiao, Kera Hsiao, Kurt
Anderson, Leslie Kurys, Shelby Kurys and Mary Ellen Sisneros
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Affiant, a Salt Lake City Detective, bases this information upon the statements of
Paul Harbrecht, clerk at Top Stop, 488 East 100 South, that February 20, 1995, at 8:06 PM, a
male Hispanic person wearing a white baseball cap and a two-tone waist length blue-green jacket
and whom he has identified as the defendant, came into the store, pointed a revolver at Mr.
Harbrecht, demanded money from the cash register and from Mr. Harbrecht's wallet; that after
the defendant left, Mr. Harbrecht saw him get into a light colored 1970fs Camero.
Affiant also bases this information upon the statements of Jesse Baldwin, night shift
supervisor at Pizza Hut, 787 North Redwood Road, that February 20, 1995, at 8:44 PM a male
Hispanic person, wearing a white baseball cap and a two-tone blue-green jacket and whom he
has identified as the defendant, pointed a revolver at various people in the Pizza Hut, including at
Mr. Baldwin, demanding money from the cash register and from the safe; that he pointed the
revolver at Candice Hsiao, demanding money from her which she gave him from her day
planner; that he pointed the revolver at Kara Hsiao, demanding the crumpled dollar bills that
Kara had in her hand; that he pointed the revolver at Leslie Kurys and Shelby Kurys, demanding
their wedding rings.

ADDENDUM G

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant, Gino Maestas, of the
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count II of the
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 20th day of February, 1995, in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gino Maestas,
took personal property then in the possession of Pizza Hut, from
the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin; and
2.

That such taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking was against the will of Jesse Baldwin;

5.

That such taking was accomplished by means of force or

and

fear; and
6.

That

in

the

course

of

committing

such

taking,

a

dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged
in count II of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of count II.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant, Gino Maestas, of the
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count VIII of the
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of
that offense:
1.

That on or about the 20th day of February, 1995, in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gino Maestas,
took personal property then in the possession of Jesse Baldwin,
from the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin; and
2.

That such taking was unlawful; and

3.

That such taking was intentional; and

4.

That such taking was against the will of Jesse Baldwin;

5.

That such taking was accomplished by means of force or

and

fear; and
6.

That

in

the

course

of

committing

such

taking,

a

dangerous weapon was used.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged
in count VIII of the information.

If, on the other hand, you are

not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty
of count VIII.

